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U.S. maritime policy immediately following World War II included the disposal f 
surplus merchant vessels to foreign countries under the terms of the Merchant Ship 
Sales Act of 1946.  Concurrently, U.S. foreign policy was directed toward restoring 
balanced international trade and monetary flows.  The U.S. Maritime Commission 
and the U.S. Department of State found a common purpose in the sales of surplus 
ships to foreign nations.  The Maritime Commission wanted to rid itself of vessels it 
had no need to operate or maintain, and the State Department was anxious to facilitate
vessel sales to further its foreign policy goals that included rapid global economic 
recovery, thriving multilateral trade, and containment of communism.  This thesis
examines the international objectives and outcomes of the combined efforts of the 
U.S. Maritime Commission and the U.S. Department of State to distribute surplus 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 When the United Stated emerged from World War II as the preeminent world 
power, policymakers recognized that worldwide economic stability could only be 
restored through multilateral trade and balanced currency flows.  Planners at the U.S. 
Department of State understood that a swift postwar recovery, especially in Europe, 
would best serve the economic, political, and foreign policy interests of the United 
States.  At the same time, the U.S. Maritime Commission recognized that its mssive 
wartime merchant fleet was destined to become a peacetime burden on the United 
States.  The U.S. government owned fifty million tons of war-built shipping that 
amounted to 60 percent of the world’s total.1  The Maritime Commission understood 
that selling surplus vessels to both domestic and foreign private operators would be in 
America’s best interest. 
 The State Department’s goal of speeding postwar economic recovery through 
the transportation of relief supplies and the resumption of world trade coincided with 
the Maritime Commission’s need to dispose of surplus cargo ships.  Countries 
requiring these vessels as replacements for their own wartime shipping losses worked 
closely with the State Department to obtain these ships.  In many cases, the State 
Department was purposefully involved in the sales with the desire to influence a 
positive economic or political outcome.  Historians have explored the actions of the 
United States in its various postwar efforts to contain Communism, or achieve other 
                                                
1 Emory S. Land to the Department of State, July 7, 1942; Subject Files 1940-1948; Shipping 
Policy Files; Office of Transportation and Communications, Shipping Division; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, 




political ends through economic means, such as the Marshall Plan and free trade 
policies.  However, none have considered the role that merchant ship sales played as a 
tool of U.S. foreign policy.  This study of the disposal of surplus merchant vessels by 
the United States during this period eliminates this historiographical deficiency. 
 This thesis will argue that the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Maritime 
Commission cooperatively developed a postwar shipping strategy involving the 
foreign sales of war-built merchant vessels.  This strategy was developed to 
accomplish political and economic foreign policy goals in order to shape the postwar 
world in accordance with the interests of the United States.  Domestically, these sales 
served as a means to help solve the postwar problem of surplus vessels.  
Internationally, due to necessity for swift European economic recovery and the rapid 
onset of the Cold War, the sale of surplus U.S. built cargo ships and tankers became 
one of a new brand of weapons wielded by the United States in its efforts to establish 
worldwide cooperative multilateral trade, promote capitalism and foster U.S. business 
interests, and thwart the emerging Communist influence throughout the postwar 
world.  This thesis will explore the relationship that developed between the State 
Department and the Maritime Commission as it related to both domestic and foreign
postwar maritime policy.  It will examine the development of the Emergency Ship 
Building Program and it significant vessel types, the Merchant Marine Sales Act of 
1946, the enabling legislation drafted by the Maritime Commission that permitted 
foreign sales to take place, and finally the sales to selected nations where the State 




Traditional examinations of postwar U.S. maritime history maintain a purely 
domestic focus on this story, offering only brief mention of the international 
implications of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946.  K. Jack Bauer praises the Act 
as “a piece of great altruism,” concluding that “the United States played a major role 
in restoring the sea legs to the traditional maritime powers of Europe,” but does not 
elaborate further.2  Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan’s study of U.S. maritime 
policy acknowledges the Act’s role in replenishing the commercial fleets of Eur pean 
countries such as Norway, Denmark, and France, but goes on to state that the policy 
of foreign ship sales “accelerated the decline of America’s position in world trade.”3  
Viewing the Act from a business perspective, Rene De La Pedraja cites evid nce that 
international surplus ship sales were contrived as a means to protect and preserve 
U.S. shipyards by encouraging foreign countries to purchase used vessels rather 
rebuild their domestic shipbuilding industries.4  Finally, a recently published work, 
The Way of the Ship: America’s Maritime History Reenvisioned 1600 – 2000,
connects the Marshall Plan, the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, and the need to 
revitalize maritime trade.  However, the emphasis is placed on what the United States 
lost rather than what America and the world gained in terms of European postwar 
economic and political recovery.   
Unfortunately, the international significance of foreign vessel sales in the 
years from 1946 to 1948 has been virtually ignored by both maritime and diplomatic 
                                                
2 K. Jack Bauer, A Maritime History of the United States: The Role of America’s Seas and 
Waterways (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 311. 
3 Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States 
Maritime Policy (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 171. 
4 Rene De La Pedraja, The Rise and Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth 




historians.  This examination looks beyond the sales of these vessels and their effect 
on the United States maritime industry and, in the vein of recent work by Thomas 
Bender, adopts a transnational view of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 through 
the lens of U.S. foreign policy, postwar international recovery efforts and outcomes, 
and the onset of the Cold War. 
 A study of maritime policy alone is not sufficient to address the scope of th  
foreign sales of U.S. war-built vessels.  The planning and execution of this program 
was conducted against a backdrop of international initiatives involving U.S. foreign 
relations.  These include establishment of the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, as 
well as U.S. loans to Allied nations and the European Recovery Plan.  Vessel sales 
made under the authority the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 cannot be adequately 
examined without consideration of U.S. foreign relations, international economic 
history, and the emergence of geopolitical tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  With this in mind, the exploration of this topic calls for an evaluation 
of the actions of the State Department and the foreign policy goals that were aid d by 
the sale of surplus merchant vessels by the Maritime Commission.  Since these sales 
took place at an extraordinarily critical time, this thesis argues that U.S. foreign 
policy and maritime policy goals converged at a critical junction of U.S. capitalistic, 
democratic momentum, and Communist political influence and party expansion.  
 The United States entered the postwar years wielding great power, part of 
which was possession of the largest fleet of merchant vessels in the world.  The bulk 




cargo carrying vessel needed to prosecute war or conduct peacetime commercial 
commerce.  As early as 1942, with an optimistic outlook toward an Allied victory, the 
U.S. Maritime Commission began planning for the postwar disposition of the 
American merchant marine which included a plan to sell surplus vessels to the 
maritime nations of the world.  At the same time, the U.S. State Department became 
interested in the means to transfer title of vessels to foreign concerns where it might 
help U.S. interests.  However, there was no law in place authorizing permanent 
transfers or sales of these ships.  Congress would need to enact such a law and the 
Commission began drafting proposed legislation.  The culmination of its efforts was 
the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, a law that set forth the provisions allowing the 
Maritime Commission to sell surplus merchant vessels to both domestic and 
international buyers. 
 The Commission’s serious concern regarding the large number of merchant 
ships that would be idled at the end of the Second World War had its roots in the 
consequences of a similar experience following World War I.  That war generated the 
same need for increased military sealift capability and also necessitat d the creation 
of an emergency shipbuilding program.  The Maritime Commission’s predecessor 
organizations, the United States Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation were created to implement and manage the program.  Unfortunately for 
the Shipping Board’s planners, the Armistice was signed before the majority of the 
new vessels could be completed and placed in service.  Rather than terminate the 




contracted to build.  As a result, by 1922 the United States government had created 
the world’s largest merchant marine.5 
 In an effort to preserve and protect this position of maritime strength, 
Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.  This Act called for the 
establishment of a privately operated merchant marine and authorized the Shipping 
Board to determine what steamship lines should be established, and the essential trade 
routes that should be maintained to best serve the trading requirements of the United 
States.  By 1922, shipping was experiencing a major depression, freight rates were 
low, and there was a glut of government-owned vessels being operated by private 
shipping companies at tremendous public expense.  Other vessels that had been 
purchased from the government were also being operated by the private companies.  
However, as freight rates fell, the private companies, regardless of the ownership of 
the vessels in operation, turned to the government for a financial fix.  The U.S. 
Shipping Board revamped its policies and through a loosely administered systemof 
lucrative mail contracts, the private shipping companies unloaded their old tonnage 
and purchased new vessels at bargain prices.  They were then allowed to subsidize 
their operation carrying the U.S. mail.  The result of the Shipping Board’s support of 
private enterprise was that individual shipping executives became personally 
enriched, while their poorly managed companies slipped into decline and bankruptcy.  
This prompted a highly publicized Congressional investigation of the U.S. shipping 
industry conducted by Senator Hugo Black of Alabama in 1935.  The investigation 
                                                
5 Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Shipping Policies and Politics (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1966), 40 and John H. Kemble and Lane C. Kendall, “The Years 
Between the Wars: 1919-1939,” in America’s Maritime Legacy: A History of the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Since Colonial Times, ed. Robert A. Kilmarx (Boulder, CO: Westview 




uncovered a web of waste, corruption, and manipulation of mail contacts which 
implicated both Shipping Board members and shipping company executives.  The 
outgrowth of these findings was new legislation, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 
which provided for a revamped national maritime policy administered by a new body, 
the United States Maritime Commission.6  
 World War II thrust the U.S. Maritime Commission into the same untenable 
position as its predecessor organizations.  It was presiding over a massive emerg ncy 
shipbuilding program to support wartime sealift that would once again create a huge 
postwar surplus of vessels which the government would have to somehow dispose of.  
In this case however, the Commission actively sought a solution that would avoid the 
mistakes of the past and their considerable political ramifications.   
Under the chairmanship of retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Emory S. “Jerry” 
Land, the Commission envisioned the problem from a global perspective.7  Land and 
his fellow commissioners began assessing the state of international shipping 
immediately prior to the war, the ongoing losses of merchant tonnage, and the 
addition of tonnage through new building.  In considering these factors, the 
Commission determined that the United States shipping industry would utilize 
                                                
6 This era has been examined in detail by a number of maritime histories.  Andrew Gibson 
and Arthur Donovan,  The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), The Rise and Decline of U.S. 
Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), Samuel 
A. Lawrence, United States Shipping Policies and Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1966) also see Edmund E. Day, “The American Merchant Fleet: A War 
Achievement, a Peace Problem,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 34, no. 4. (1920): 567-
606, John G. B. Hutchins, “The American Shipping Industry since 1914,” The Business 
History Review 28, no. 2. (1954): 105-127. 
7 Emory S. Land retired from active military service in 1937 as a Rear Admiral USN 
(Retired).  He was made a Vice Admiral USN (Retired) by a special act of Congress in 1944.  
Naval custom and tradition dictates that when an officer attains flag rank, they are addressed 




roughly 10 percent of the war-built tonnage in postwar trade, and that a certain 
number of various vessel types should be retained in a reserve status for future 
national defense sealift requirements.  The Commission then recommended that the
remaining surplus vessels be made available for sale to foreign countries to 
reestablish and replenish the cargo carrying capabilities they had possessed prior to 
the war.8  
 International considerations not withstanding, the sale of practically new 
merchant ships built at taxpayer expense to foreign buyers was bound to create 
controversy.  On the other hand, the scandal surrounding the former U.S. Shipping 
Board regarding the disposition of surplus vessels after the First World War was still 
relatively fresh in the minds of Congress and the public.  The Maritime Commission 
actively promoted legislation that would permit the sale of war-built ships tereby 
discouraging government involvement in the operation of these vessels, and also 
eliminating the cost to store and maintain them in an inactive status. 
 Admiral Land and his staff drafted legislation providing for the sale of surplus 
ships to domestic and foreign buyers, keeping the State Department advised during 
the process.  The draft legislation was presented to the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee in early 1944.  American shipping and shipbuilding interests 
were pleased with legislative provisions that benefited them, but deeply divided over 
the prospect of international vessel charter or sales.  The admiral and his fellow 
commissioners defended foreign sales as sound national maritime policy.  The State 
                                                
8 U.S. Maritime Commission, A Postwar Plan for the American Merchant Marine, October 
1944; Material Relating to Post War Planning; Records of the Public Information Division, 
1936-1944; Records of the United States Maritime Commission, Record Group 178; National 




Department, represented by Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. 
“Will” Clayton, who actively promoted and defended the proposal as necessary for 
European recovery and establishing a postwar schema of multilateral free trad .9 
After several versions of the bill and protracted debate in both the House and the 
Senate, Congress passed the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 which provided for 
both domestic and foreign sales of surplus war-built ships.   
The war-torn countries of Europe were of the most concern to the United 
States and in fact, garnered the most benefit from the Sales Act.  However, ship sales 
to countries in the Americas, as well as China, also served U.S. interests, facili ating 
the restoration of trade, spurring the global economy, and providing certain political 
and diplomatic leverage.  Concurrent with the efforts toward economic recovery, the 
Cold War emerged and added geopolitical factors which gave additional impetus to 
the sales of surplus merchant vessels to certain maritime nations during the immediate 
postwar years.  By the time the Act’s sales provisions expired on March 1, 1948, its 
disposal goal had been accomplished.  Under the terms of the Act, 823 vessels were 
sold domestically, but 1,113 went to foreign owners in nearly every maritime 
nation.10   
It is important to understand that the United States did not simply unload 
surplus obsolete tonnage on desperate international buyers to alleviate a potential 
domestic problem.  Rather, the Act came to represent a consciously executed 
                                                
9 William L. Clayton served in a number of top government positions during World War II.  
He was, in order of service, Deputy Federal Loan Administrator, Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce, Surplus War Property Administrator, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, and Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs.  
10 Samuel A. Lawrence, United States Shipping Policies and Politics (Washington, DC: 




extension of U.S. involvement in world affairs in the twentieth century.  The Unitd 
States, as a creditor nation with major investments on every continent and dependent 
on an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, actively promoted surplus vessel sale  to 













Chapter 2: The War-Built Ships 
 
 By any measure, the U.S. Maritime Commission’s emergency shipbuilding 
program was a production miracle.  Between 1939 and the end of World War II, the 
United States constructed 5,777 vessels with a cargo carrying capacity of 
approximately 56.3 million deadweight tons.11  The majority comprised three 
standard designs intended for wartime service:  the EC2-S-C1 Liberty ships, the VC2-
S-C1 Victory ships, both dry cargo vessels, and the T2-SE-A1 liquid cargo tankers 
known simply as “T-2’s.”  In addition to these ships, the Maritime Commission 
designed and built a grouping of standard dry cargo vessels of varying sizes referred 
to as C1, C2, C3, and C4.12  Of these, the “C-3’s” were the most numerous.  The 
designs of all C type vessels were based on commercial dry cargo applications, and 
were faster, more efficient ships than the Liberties. 
 The World War forced the development of an emergency shipbuilding 
program, and the momentum of the U.S. wartime production juggernaut made 
changes in design or slowing of production difficult to implement.  It was the mass 
production of these ships, especially the Liberty type, which posed a significant 
postwar problem.  More Liberty ships were built than the United States wanted or 
                                                
11 Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 4. 
12 The Maritime Commission adopted an alphanumeric system to identify the standard 
designs of its vessels.  P indicated a passenger vessel, C for cargo, and T for tanker.  The 
number after the letter designation indicated the length category the ship fell into.  The higher 
this number, the longer the ship.  The letter in the middle of the designation represented the 
propulsion system, S for steam or M for motor diesel.  The last alphanumeric groupin  
indicated the design number.  The E preceding the Liberty ship designation stood for 
emergency and the Victory ships were prefaced with V.  These designators served to 
distinguish these vessels form those designed specifically for commercial purposes.  The 
Commission also built a N3 Coastal Cargo Type, a small vessel designed for short haul 




needed.  However, they were easy and fast to build, simple to operate, and regarded 
as expendable.   
Great Britain actually began building the Liberty type vessels in the United 
States prior to U.S. entry into the Second World War.  From the moment England 
declared war on Nazi Germany, it began experiencing staggering shipping losses 
primarily from German U-boat attacks.  In the first year of the war, Allied shipping 
losses totaled 315 ships with the total reaching 538 by February of 1941.13  As a 
harbinger of things to come for the United States, the British realized the urgent need 
for a suitable transport ship that could be mass produced.  It turned to the United 
States and the U.S. Maritime Commission for help.   
 In September1940, the British organized a technical shipbuilding mission to 
travel to the United States to explore the possibility of contracting with U.S. 
shipyards to build sixty dry cargo vessels of approximately ten thousand deadweight 
tons each, with a service speed of 10.5 knots.14  The mission arrived in New York in 
early October.  After preliminary meetings with British officials stationed there, the 
group traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with the Maritime Commission Chairman 
Admiral Emory S. Land.15  When the five member group sat down with the admiral, 
they faced a person who had been recently criticized regarding the effectiv n ss of 
                                                
13 National Archives of the United Kingdom, “The Learning Curve, World WarII, Atlantic 
1939-1945: Battle of the Atlantic,” http://www.learningcurve.gov.uk/worldwar2/theatres-of-
war/atlantic/investigation/battle-of-the-atlantic/sources/docs/1/. This figure was derived from 
contemporary source documents and conflicts with more recent estimates wher totals for the 
period range from low of 606 to a high of nearly 1,300. Also see American Merchant Mari e 
at War, “Battle of the Atlantic Statistics,” http://www.usmm.org/battleatlantic.html. 
14 The speed of ocean-going vessels is measured in nautical miles per hour o “knots.”  A 
nautical mile is approximately 6,076 feet.  The maximum speed of these ships converted to 
statute miles was approximately 12 miles per hour. 





his efforts to revitalize the American merchant marine.  That August, the Commission 
had been chastised in a widely read trade publication saying, “It has been the chief 
weakness of all of the activities of the Maritime Commission that it has shown 
insufficient appreciation of the fact that the capacity of the shipyards was the 
principal problem confronting it from the very beginning.”16  When the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 was signed, the average age of an American merchant ship wa 
twenty years and a number of U.S. shipyards had gone out of business due to lack of 
orders and the economic pressures of the Great Depression.  Suddenly there was a 
demand for both naval and commercial ship construction. 
 With German military successes in Europe, Congress, at President 
Roosevelt’s urging, passed the Two Ocean Navy Act which authorized building 201 
new warships.  Commercial construction was already well underway at the behest of 
the Commission.  In the years between its creation and the start of the war, the 
Commission had contracted to build C-2 cargo vessels in U.S. yards on speculation 
that commercial companies would purchase the ready-made ships as replacements for 
those of World War I vintage, which many did.  The Commission was able to act in 
this manner because Merchant Marine Act of 1936 authorized this type of 
construction program subject to the express approval of the president.17  It is clear 
that both the Commission and the White House were in tune with the need for ships 
of all types, and the shipyard capacity required for building them.  This awareness 
was even more acute to Land, Roosevelt, and their successors throughout the war into 
                                                
16 “Admiral Land’s Task,” Shipping World, August 21, 1940, Records of the Public 
Information Division, 1936-1944; Records of the United States Maritime Commission, 
Record Group 178; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 




the postwar years.  Shipping World’s assessment of Admiral Land and the 
Commission was unfair in that from 1933 until his appointment to the Maritime 
Commission in 1937, then Rear Admiral Land, had been the chief constructor of the 
Navy and chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair.  Perhaps no one else was in 
a better position to appreciate the state of the American shipping and shipbuilding 
industry than Admiral Land.   
By the time the British shipbuilding mission reached Land’s office, nearly all 
of the country’s available shipbuilding capacity was being utilized.  With this in 
mind, when Land heard the magnitude of the British proposal, he informed them, 
“You will have to see about building your own shipyards over here.”18  As it turns 
out, that is exactly what they resolved to do.  From Washington, the mission 
embarked on a nationwide quest to secure the necessary backing to construct and 
operate two shipyards capable of quickly delivering the desperately needed ships. 
 The mission moved with all deliberate speed.  On December 20, 1940, the 
British Government entered into a contract with Todd Shipyard Corporation of New 
York valued at approximately ninety-six million dollars.  The contract called for the 
construction of two shipyards, one in Richmond, California and one in South 
Portland, Maine.  Each location had been selected and approved by the Maritime 
Commission.  Included in this figure was the cost to build sixty of the new British 
designed ships which they designated as the “Ocean” class.  To accomplish the job, 
two separate corporate entities were created.  On the East Coast, the Todd-Bath Iron 
Shipbuilding Corporation was established, headed by William S. Newell.  Newell was 
                                                





also president of the nearby Bath Iron Works Corporation, a builder of U.S. Navy 
destroyers.  On the West Coast, the Todd-California Shipbuilding Corporation was 
formed, led by Henry J. Kaiser of Six Companies, Inc. fame.19  Each yard was to 
build thirty vessels.  
 The significance of this story is that it introduces a number of important 
developments which shaped the postwar shipping picture.  The British design for 
these cargo vessels, after certain modifications, became what the U.S. built and 
branded as the Liberty ship.  The Maine and California yards served as the models for 
seven other specially built “Maritime Commission” yards, which turned out the 
thousands of war-built vessels of various Commission designs.  The layout and 
construction of these two shipyards, and those that closely followed, were built from 
the ground up, incorporating innovations that fostered dramatic improvements in 
production capacity throughout the war years.  The first sixty ships, built to British 
specifications, were of all welded, modular construction that, to a large degree, 
allowed assembly line like construction.  This in turn permitted unheard of speed in 
production and delivery.  British shipbuilding in the United States provided the basis 
for the U.S. Emergency Shipbuilding Program which began in early 1941 and, by the 
end of the Second World War, would produce more than fifty-six million deadweight 
tons of ships. 
 America’s emergency shipbuilding program was announced by the president 
in January 1941.  Since the United States was not at war, the urgency of building 
shipyards and ships had to be explained and sold to the public through press releases, 
                                                
19 Six Companies was the name given a consortium of engineering and construction firms 




speeches, and radio broadcasts.  In a fireside chat delivered May 27, 1941, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a warning to the American people concerning the 
consequences of Axis control of the seas, and endorsed “speeding up and increasing 
our own great shipbuilding program.”20  The maritime commissioners followed suit in 
their public speeches.  As 1941 progressed and the emergency shipbuilding program 
got underway, the Commission sought to foster public consciousness of the effort and 
have the public identify with the ships themselves. Because the vessels had a rather 
homely design, they were dubbed “ugly ducklings” in the popular press.  However, 
by the time the first of the type was launched at the Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard in 
Baltimore on September 27, 1941, the Commission’s branding efforts had succeeded 
in transforming the EC2-S-C1 “ugly ducklings” into “Liberty Ships.”21  Christened 
the S.S. Patrick Henry by the wife of Vice President Henry A. Wallace, the ship was 
purposely named by the Commission to equate the class of vessels with the closing 
words of Henry’s famous Revolutionary War speech.22  In prerecorded remarks to 
mark the occasion, President Roosevelt reasserted the connection and stated, “There 
shall be no death for America, for democracy, for freedom.  There must be liberty 
worldwide and eternal.”23  Both the president and the Maritime Commission appealed 
to the public's sense of patriotism and America's responsibility to democracy in the 
world to garner support for ships and shipbuilding.  What is key here, is that Maritime 
                                                
20 Mid-Hudson Regional Information Center, “Address of the President Deliver d by Radio 
From the White House,” http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat17.html. 
21 Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 66-
68. 
22 George Bookman, Washington Post, “S.S. Patrick Henry Gets Early Start,” September 28, 
1941. 





Commission, the Chief Executive and the Department of State were forced to engage
in the same techniques less than two years later in an effort to convince Americans 
who were proud of their Liberty ships that the United States had too many and that it 
would be of greater benefit to them and the world if the "ugly ducklings" were sold to 
foreign buyers. 
 The development of the emergency shipbuilding program also highlights the 
personal relationships in place as the war effort geared up.  President Roosevelt was 
fond of the U.S. Navy and ships in general, having been an assistant secretary of the 
Navy from 1913 to 1920.  While in that post, he and then Lieutenant Commander 
Land became close friends.  Land’s naval career included duty as naval attché in 
London during the 1920’s, and ultimately he rose to become the Navy’s top admiral 
for construction and repair.  As a consequence, he was not an Anglophobe and he was 
intimately familiar with the world of shipbuilding.24  Winston Churchill’s rise to 
prominence also introduced his naval background as a former Lord of the Admiralty 
which offered a common bond with FDR.  Finally, given that the president had been 
granted the statutory oversight of Maritime Commission shipbuilding, the circle was 
complete.  President Roosevelt wanted to aid the British fight against the Nazis in ny 
way that he legally could. He knew and trusted Admiral Land and admired Churchill. 
U.S. decision makers at every level recognized how each country would derive long-
range benefits from supporting a British shipbuilding venture in the United States.  
Construction of the shipyards began immediately.  The first of the “Ocean” lass 
vessels was launched in Richmond, California on October 14, 1941.  The ship was 
                                                





christened by Mrs. Emory S. Land.25  Because of the British need to build versatile 
transport ships faster than they could be sunk, the course was laid for America’s 
emergency shipbuilding program.   
 The line drawings that follow illustrate the Maritime Commission vessel 
design types produced in the large numbers under the emergency shipbuilding 
program.  After the end of the war, it was the sale of these vessel types that were 
deemed surplus and specifically addressed in the Merchant Ship Sale Act of 1946. 
 
Figure 1 
 The EC-S-C1 "Liberty" type totaled 2,708 ships built from 1941 to 1945.26  
As these vessels we delivered by the builders, some were transferred to Allied nations 
under the terms of various lend-lease agreements with the United States.  The new 
Liberty ships, as well as other selected ship types, helped support the Allied miitary 
and commercial needs.  Once production of these vessels reached full capacity in lte 
1943, the average time of construction per vessel was approximately forty-two days.27  
Over the course of the war, the British received and operated two hundred ships.  The 
                                                
25 Frederic C. Lane, Ships for Victory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 81. 
26 Ibid., Various sources show small variations of this number.  This paper will conform to 
the numbers provided in Lane. 




Russians were given forty-three.  Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and 
China together received fifty.28  The remaining vessels were operated throughout the 




 The VC2-S-C1 "Victory" type was the successor to the Liberty, somewhat 
similar in size and cargo carrying capacity, these newer vessels had an improved 
propulsion plant that produced a top speed of fifteen knots.  The design took 
advantage of standardized construction method.  The Victory ship was conceived in 
1942 as a replacement for the Liberty but internal government conflicts delaye  the 
start of production until late 1943.  The first of the type was finally delivered in 
February 1944.  As a result, far fewer Victories were built than originally planned.  
During the course of the war, 414 Victory cargo ships were built that served in the 
same capacities as the Liberty Ships.  Another 117 of the Victory ships were modified 
to serve as troop carriers.29 
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 The various “C” type cargo vessels were also of Maritime Commission 
design, varying by length.  These ships were conceived and designed primarily for 
commercial applications.  The smallest of the group were the C-1’s, ranging from 309 
to 412 feet in length.  These were designed for shorter coastal runs, were powerd by 
diesel engines, and had a service speed of eleven to fourteen knots.  The C-2’s which 
were designed by the newly formed Maritime Commission in 1937 and 1938.  A 
number of these vessels were constructed before the war for commercial interests in 
order to facilitate the replacement of an aging American fleet.  Wartime construction 
consisted of 173 vessels.  These ships were 459 feet long and could operate at 15.5 
knots.  The most numerous of the group were the C-3’s.  At 492 feet long and able to 
operate at 16.5 knots, these were operated commercially, as U.S. Army transports, 
and by the War Shipping Administration.  These were the vessels of primary interest 
to shipowners everywhere who were vying to purchase war-built ships.  The 
previously described vessels were purely of Maritime Commission design.  The C-4 
type was originally designed for America-Hawaiian Lines in 1941 and the 




Commission built at 523 feet, with a top speed of seventeen knots.  Seventy-five of 
these vessels were built and most of them were utilized as troop transports. 
 
Figure 4 
 The T2-SE-A1 type tanker was built between 1942 and 1945 using the same 
construction techniques as the Liberty ships.  At peak production, this allowed an 
average construction time of about seventy days.  Much like the "C" type ships, these 
tankers were constructed in different lengths and deadweight tonnages specific to 
their intended use.  The smaller versions carried specialized products such as 
gasoline, while the larger ships carried crude oil, fuel oil, or served as fleet oil rs 
replenishing naval vessels at sea.  This version had a cargo capacity of six million 
gallons.  Altogether, 705 tankers were built by the Maritime Commission duri g the 
war, with 481 being T-2's.30 
 Well before the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the United States was actively
preparing for what became a two ocean war.  Allied experience with German U-boat 
attacks pointed to the need for swift action to keep up with vessel losses.  The British 
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brought their need for ships to the United States.  The Maritime Commission met that 
need and adopted the British design, creating the ubiquitous Liberty ship.  This vessel 
became the backbone of the U.S. emergency shipbuilding program.  Once America 
entered the war, what the British began, the Maritime Commission finished.  
Production was expanded to include all manner of cargo and tank vessels, delivered 
















Chapter 3: Surplus Ships and Postwar Policy 
 
 As early as 1942, it was clear to Admiral Land that the United States would 
emerge from the war with the largest merchant fleet in the world.  Existing long-term 
plans and demonstrated production capabilities made forecasting future tonnage 
numbers a relatively straightforward matter.  Seven months to the day after the 
Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the chairman of the United States Maritime 
Commission and now head of the War Shipping Administration (WSA) submitted a 
memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull concerning the worldwide 
distribution of merchant vessels at the conclusion of the war.31  In doing so, Land 
made reference to a British “white paper” in which His Majesty’s governmnt had put 
forth a method of procedure permitting them to allocate a proportion of old and newly 
constructed merchant ships to their maritime allies after the war.   
 Allied maritime nations were so hampered by wartime shipping losses that 
they were already meeting with the Maritime Commission and the WSA to discuss 
replacement of lost vessels which had made such an important contribution in the 
early days of the war.  Representatives of the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Greece, 
China, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were exerting pressure on the United States
government to share the wealth in terms of replacing lost ships.32  A full three years, 
and several thousand ships before Allied victory was achieved, Admiral Land as the 
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czar of wartime non-naval ship construction and operation, began actively seeking a 
peacetime solution for distributing surplus merchant ships to countries in need. 
 Primarily, it was British and Norwegian prescience and pressure that 
encouraged Land to begin addressing the consequences of the Emergency 
Shipbuilding Program.  As chairman of the Commission, he was well aware of the 
legal aspects surrounding the sale of U.S. built vessels to foreign nations for operation 
under their flag.  The Lend-Lease Act was very specific about how such vessels could 
be operated, but contained only vague language regarding outright sales to Allied 
nations.  However, the British could act in any manner that they so chose, which 
meant that they could avail themselves of U.S. war-built vessels while distributng 
their own tonnage, old or new, to Allied countries in need after the war.  Of course, 
they were not expected to be in a position to influence postwar vessel sales on the 
scale of the United States, but they certainly could affect foreign new-building orders 
for U.S. shipyards in the postwar years.  Therefore, the Maritime Commission and the 
State Department thoroughly studied the British plan and its post war implications. 
 The British began in May 1942 by developing a plan allowing British 
shipowners to purchase “new vessels built on government account” to replace ships 
lost due to the war.  Under such a program, British shipowners could contract for new 
vessels, at government construction cost, less depreciation on the annual basis of the 
lost vessel.  The plan specifically stipulated that in determining the amount of tonnage 
to be made available to British operators, “regard is made for arrangements made 
with Allied governments for enabling them to replace a proportion of their tonnage 




Allied governments “may be transferred to their ownership and flag during the war 
period, but remain available for the service of the Minister of War.”  The plan 
contained specific guidelines as to eligibility, as well as the terms and conditions for 
the program.  Once a vessel was purchased, the owner agreed not to sell the vessel for 
a period of three years from the date of delivery.33  Whereas the United States was 
restricted by the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, the British plan facilitated 
immediate direct sales.  In July, His Majesty’s Government also developed “a scheme 
for the purchase of merchant vessels by Allied governments from H. M. 
Government,” a proposal that specifically addressed foreign sales of British 
government-owned vessels.34  Britain was under more pressure to deal with its 
European allies because of the support it had been receiving in the form of ships since 
1939.  At the time these plans were promulgated, Allied shipping in general was 
suffering its worst losses of the war.  However, in the midst of this, the purchase 
scheme spoke of eventual Allied victory.  The British plan called for vessels 
purchased by foreign interests to remain chartered to the Ministry of War Transport 
for six months after the cessation of hostilities and “also understanding that the 
vessels are to be available for the purpose of revictualling Europe.”  However, at this 
point in the war, the British were concerned only with meeting obligations to its 
European Allies.  Soon after the plan’s implementation, eight ships were delivered to 
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Norway and two to Belgium, with thirteen more assigned to Norway, seven to 
Belgium and three to the Netherlands as they became available.35 
 The U.S. Maritime Commission Division of Economics and Statistics 
reviewed the British sales plans immediately after they were released.  In a memo to 
the commissioners summarizing the plans, the author outlined the political fallout in 
Britain over the plans that involved debate over nationalized shipping versus the 
allotment to private ownership provided by the plan.  However, for the shipping 
industry there was no debate.  Quoting from current issues of the British trade journal 
Shipping World, the memo presented the commissioners with the competitive reality 
of the British plan,   
…for British shipping to reach a state of full and competitive efficiency, a 
fleet of superlative vessels must be brought into being; specialized in type 
according to the intended trade, they must incorporate to the full the products 
of the undoubted skill of our designers, both naval architects and marine 
engineers.36 
 
The article went on to caution that trying to sell “standardized, war-built, 
uneconomical ships” to British shipping concerns was not a useful contribution to 
reinvestment in full and competitive efficiency.37  It is logical to surmise that this 
euphemistic language refers to the British Ocean and American Liberty ships.  This 
sort of language recalled Great Britain’s prewar ranking as possessing the world’s 
largest merchant fleet, and undoubtedly the desire to resume that position after the 
war.   
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 The Maritime Commission read, understood, and acted based on the plans of 
the British government.  Admiral Land, writing to Secretary of State Hull, 
summarized the British program of vessel sales and offered an overall positive 
opinion toward a similar U.S. plan.  However, it was very clear that Land was 
desirous of a well reasoned and coordinated approach; 
 The Maritime Commission-War Shipping Administration believes that the 
 problem should be faced at the earliest practicable date and the 
 Administration’s policy stated so that the evaluation and the mechanics of the 
 problem may be set in motion to fit with approved administration policy. 
 We have before us the pattern and precedent established by the United 
 Kingdom and with this as a foundation; it is believed to be practicable to work 
 out a satisfactory solution both qualitatively and quantitatively.  It is our 
 opinion that from a United Nations war effort point of view this problem 
 should be attacked on its merits and proper policy established, not only for 
 psychological and diplomatic reasons but also for the overall war effort. 
 From a legal point of view it appears that clearance is available under the 
 first Lease-Lend Act to go as far as the United States government desires to 
 go.  Subsequent legislation prevents the title of vessels under Lease-Lend but 
 does not prohibit the transfer of flag which, of course, permits manning and 
 operations by the foreign-flag countries of the United Nations.38 
 
 The communication between the chairman of the Maritime Commission and 
the secretary of state in mid-1942 signaled the start of the cooperative effort b tween 
the State Department and the Maritime Commission on the formulation of policy 
regarding the sale of war-built vessels to foreign countries.  From this level, the 
discussions moved further down the chain of command and became more specific.  In 
a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson written during the same period, 
the Deputy Director of the War Shipping Administration L.W. Douglas addressed 
specific considerations regarding vessel sales to foreigners, in this case Norway.  
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What he referred to as “short-term projects” were transfers that could be affected 
under the terms of Lend-Lease and presented little problem.  However, “long-range 
projects” were another matter.  Douglas acknowledged that the War Shipping 
Administration (WSA) had “in the past, found it convenient to transfer the 
documentation of certain vessels to Panamanian flag in order to overcome the more 
severe restriction prevailing for American vessels, and otherwise simplify o eration.  
The transfer of vessels to an Allied flag would simply be an extension of existing 
practice with increased benefits to all concerned.”39  Regarding actual sales, Douglas 
referred to the British replacement program, and assumed that in due course the 
United States would have to follow suit.  Considering that such a plan would have 
both political and economic implications, Douglas stated that “the long-range phas 
of the problem would appear to be a matter within the province of the State 
Department.”  In closing, Douglas informed Acheson that the views he expressed 
were consistent with those of the Combined Shipping Boards as recently discussed at 
meetings in London.40 
 It became clear after the British announcement of a ship replacement plan that 
the United States would need to formulate a similar plan to satisfy the shipping 
requirements of their allies and prepare for the ocean transportation needs of the 
postwar world.  If the State Department had not heretofore considered itself to b  in 
the business of ships, the Maritime Commission was maneuvering the problem of 
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postwar ship sales to foreign countries onto the edge of their radar.  The Commission 
received an assist from the Norwegians as well.  Soon after the memo between 
Douglas and Acheson, the Norwegian ambassador had appealed directly to President 
Roosevelt regarding a proposal “to charter to the Norwegian Shipping Mission, with 
an option to buy within a certain period after the end of hostilities, ten to fifteen ships, 
some of which some should be tankers.”  The president referred the matter to Admiral 
Land.  He in turn sent the ambassador to Acheson, who then promised to bring the 
matter to the attention of the secretary of state.41 
 The roundabout of diplomatic activity over ship replacement prompted the 
State Department to earnestly begin developing a postwar shipping policy which 
addressed international issues and long-range implications.  The Department 
produced E Document 37, aptly titled “Post-War Shipping Policy,” in October 1942.  
The study outlined the current status of policy discussion in the United States and the
policy that had been established by the British.  The study went on to give a historical 
overview of the shipping policies and outcomes following World War I through to the 
present day.  State Department understood the Maritime Commission’s position as 
well.  The Department noted the groups who would rally against any policy perceived 
to benefit foreign nations:  shipbuilding interests, organized labor, and shipowners 
and operators.  The study devoted a significant number of pages to cautioning the 
reader about the formidable opposition that would be encountered from domestic 
maritime interests as well as those outside of the industry who were governed and 
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driven by nationalism.  The study declared that these forces and their numerous 
arguments and objections against any foreign policy initiative they feared as harmful 
needed to be met with “a policy of sale, adopted in the near future and carried out 
before the end of the war,” at which time opposition would likely be less intense than 
after the war.  Noting “the strength and persistence of the pressure exertd by 
shipping interests to secure protection for themselves at the expense of sound national 
policy and in disregard of foreign interests,” the study reminded the reader of the 
Department’s power to overcome such opposition, citing “the extent to which treaty 
provisions and executive decisions can render [protective] legislation ineffective if i  
conflicts with foreign policy.”42 
 The foreign policy that the State Department desired to promulgate based on 
the postwar shipping policy study was one that addressed the global economic 
impacts of a surfeit of merchant vessels.  By basing its evaluation on an economic 
study of the American merchant marine done by the Maritime Commission in 1937, 
the State Department deduced that the relative economic importance of U.S. flagged 
vessels to the national economy overall was far less than that of smaller countries 
when considering their balance of payments and total income derived from 
shipping.43  The United States as a creditor nation in the postwar years would have to 
promote imports in order for foreign countries to earn enough dollars to purchase 
American goods for export.  If the United States dominated oceangoing transport tion 
under these conditions, the loss of earning power of foreign merchant fleets would 
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significantly impact debtor nations and slow economic recovery.44  The State 
Department acknowledged the implicit commitment of the United States to replace 
Allied ships lost in the war.  Beyond that, officials in the Department took the view 
that the Liberty ships would not be well suited for American liner operations, and that 
surplus ships would allow foreign countries to resume trade without waiting for their 
own shipyards to produce vessels, all to the benefit of consumers of shipping 
services.45  However, the perceived benefits did not stop there.  The State Department 
held a more grandiose view.  This study, released against the backdrop of fighting on 
three continents, spoke of international cooperation in postwar commerce. 
 Recognizing that the United States could never recover the cost of war-built 
ships, the State Department recommended that vessel prices be kept low, and credit 
terms liberal, again emphasizing the overall benefit to the U.S. in restored trad  
relations.  The Department suggested that the sale of a large number of vessels might 
also provide a basis to address international regulation of shipping to promote safety 
standards, good working conditions, and restrict unfair competitive practices.46  With 
this in mind, the study recommended accomplishing this goal through “multilateral 
agreement or by establishment of some international authority having the necessary 
powers of supervision and enforcement.”47 
 With this study, the U.S. State Department charted a course toward a postwar 
shipping policy, expecting the sale of surplus U.S. merchant ships to foreign interests.  
The Department was poised to exploit the benefits that vessel sales to foreign buyers 








would have on U.S. foreign policy and postwar economic recovery among friendly 
nations.  Both the Army and the Navy valued the strategic importance of the 
merchant vessel in the flow of material during wartime, while for its part the Stat  
Department was very quick to grasp that every “bottom” would also be of value in 
moving dollars around the globe.48  In a sense, the Department of State visualized 
these vessels, placed in foreign hands, as its own economic navy with which, in 
combination with planned navigation and trade agreements, the U.S. could wield 
significant economic clout. 
 Though the State Department and the Maritime Commission clearly were of 
the same mind regarding basic provisions of a postwar shipping policy, Admiral Land 
was not encouraging hasty action at any level.  In February 1943, Land wrote to his 
friend President Roosevelt with his recommendations not to transfer the title of any 
U.S. ships to foreign governments lest the floodgates be opened before a well vetted 
policy was in place.  At this point, Congress was not in favor of selling ships under 
the Lend-Lease Act, and thus far the president had made it his policy not to do so.  
Land asked Roosevelt to hold the line against countries “pressing you, the State 
Department, and the War Shipping Administration for ships and more ships.  Your 
present policy of holding title is sound and should be maintained despite all these 
pressures.49  Land informed the president that during the coming year, the United 
States would become the predominant owner of merchant ships and outlined a general 
plan of postwar vessel distribution to Allied nations based on their pre-war tonnage 
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and their tonnage lost in the war effort.  Even at this early date, the admiral 
recommended that the “C” type cargo ships and tank vessels be retained “while 
utilizing Liberty ships for such foreign allocations as you determine to beadvisable.”    
In closing, Land donned his maritime commissioner’s hat and told Roosevelt, 
“Naturally, this should not be mentioned, but it is my earnest belief that such a policy 
should be maintained by you to safeguard the future of the American Merchant 
Marine.”  The president responded that Land was “entirely right” in regard to U.S. 
shipping policy on ship transfers.50 
 The admiral and President Roosevelt were well aware that the Maritime 
Commission was bound by law to foster the development and encourage the 
maintenance of a viable American merchant marine.  This legal responsibility 
certainly appeared to trump the notion of selling any ships to perceived competitive 
interests.  Because of this, the opposition to foreign sales that the State Department 
study so thoroughly examined would not be directed so much toward the State 
Department, but squarely at that the U.S. Maritime Commission.  In order to blunt 
this opposition, the Commission would have to engage in a campaign to sway public 
opinion in favor of balanced foreign trade and equitable postwar distribution of 
oceangoing transportation. 
 One other aspect of organizing postwar ship disposal was untangling the 
distribution and ownership of foreign vessels seized when hostilities began.  Even 
before the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt asked for and was 
granted the power to allow the United States to acquire “the title to, or the use of, 
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domestic or foreign merchant vessels for urgent needs of commerce and national 
defense, and for other purposes.”51  His request centered on idle merchant vessels that 
were berthed in the United States by their operators in order to avoid the possibility of 
them being sunk in the North Atlantic.  Speaking before Congress on April 10, 1941, 
the president cited the authority of the Maritime Commission under the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936 to requisition, charter, or purchase any vessel or watercraft 
domestically owned during any declared national emergency.52  However, there were 
no provisions that allowed idle foreign vessels to be seized and put into service.  
Congress responded in June by enacting Public Law 77-101, the Ship Requisition 
Act, which granted the Maritime Commission the authority to acquire vessels of 
foreign registry under same terms and conditions provided for domestic vessels.  In 
addition, vessels flagged to belligerent powers that happened to be in port when a 
formal declaration of war was made, or ships registered to nations overrun and 
defeated by the Axis, had their ships seized under the provisions of the Espionage Act 
of 1917.  The United States was not alone in this practice.  Other maritime nations 
seized foreign flagged ships under similar pretenses as those used by the U.S.  As an 
example, Argentina and Brazil both seized, and either operated directly, or transferred 
to the War Shipping Administration, approximately thirty-one vessels of varying 
types.  Argentina’s government-owned shipping operation acquired the following 
vessels during the course of the war: 
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Date Acquired    Vessels   Gross Tonnage 
     1941          16 Italian Cargo         89,000 
             4 Danish Reefers        11,000 
     1942            3 German Cargo               15,000 
     1943            4 French Cargo               31,000 
             1 Romanian          4,00053 
By comparison, the United States seized approximately two hundred twenty foreign 
vessels from eleven European countries.54 
 The outgrowth of the vessel seizures by maritime countries was that these 
ships were placed in wartime shipping pool arrangements or necessary commercial 
trades regardless of whom their original owners were, and how they were acquired.  
The ships were then controlled and utilized by allied countries as dictated by wartime 
needs.  In the case of commercial trade, vessels less suited for war transport, which 
included some seized vessels, were assigned to that duty.  The more efficient sh ps 
were placed in harm’s way.  If vessels were lost, how were they to be replaced, and 
on what terms?  By the same token, the condition of the seized vessels varied from 
barely seaworthy to valuable specialty ships.  If they survived the war, what was to be 
the basis of “just compensation” for their use?  This was the problem that the British
“white paper” had made an early attempt to address. 
 In the United States, it was understood by both law and written agreement that 
when vessels were seized for wartime use they would be returned in substantially the 
same condition received along with monetary compensation for their use, or they 
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would be replaced by similar vessels.55  How that was to be accomplished had not 
been fully considered when the initial seizures took place.  However, the British did 
explore the mounting problem, undoubtedly pressed by the ongoing losses of 
merchant shipping in the Atlantic.  If foreign vessel owners were going to risk their 
vessels for the war effort, they wanted some assurance that they could resume 
commercial trade with the same or more deadweight tonnage that they possessed at 
the start of hostilities. 
 By mid-1943, the Maritime Commission, the State Department, and the 
president were well aware of America’s rising position of global maritime supremacy, 
its postwar implications, and the need for a policy.  Unlike the British, the Americans 
were not yet ready to unveil a maritime policy on vessel sales to foreign countries.  
The principals involved in the policy and decision making process understood that 
they were bound by law, politics, and public opinion.  In order to move forward with 
a policy that best served the national interest, the Maritime Commission and the 
Department of State were in communication and had agreed to work cooperatively to 
establish the mechanism necessary to allow war-built vessels to be sold to other 






                                                




Chapter 4: Selling the Sale of Ships 
 
 The United States Maritime Commission was legally charged with certain 
responsibilities, and nowhere was it written that the foreign sale of U.S. built ships 
was among them.  Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the policy of the United 
States was to have a merchant marine sufficient for the national defense and the 
development of is foreign and domestic commerce.  Section 101 of the Act stated that 
the merchant marine “be sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne cmmerce and a 
substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce…” on 
essential trade routes, capable of serving military needs in war and national 
emergencies.  It was to be owned and operated under U.S. flag by U.S. citizens 
“insofar as may be practicable,” and composed of the best suited and equipped U.S. 
built vessels.  The Maritime Commission was created by this Act to carry out the 
policy “to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant 
marine.”56  The vague language of the Act and the nature of the postwar shipping 
dilemma, combined to produce a number of paradoxes which the Commission had to 
face and resolve.  The most significant of these was how to justify the sale of surplus 
ships to foreign countries while at the same time convincing domestic maritime 
interests, and the public at large, that such a plan was in their best economic interest.  
Beyond that, the Commission had to justify the foreign ship sales as consistent with 
the policy mandate of the 1936 Act.   
                                                




 The Maritime Commission embarked on a media campaign to raise public 
awareness about the need for the United States to drastically reduce the siz  of it  
merchant fleet when the war was won.  In speeches delivered by individual 
commissioners, in newspaper and magazine articles, and in radio broadcasts, the 
message went out about the obsolescence of the Liberty ships.  In April 1943, the 
Washington Post carried an article describing the government’s internal conflict over 
the fate of Liberty ships.  The squabble was mostly about shifting production from the 
Liberty to the Victory type ships, but the message from the Maritime Commission 
was clear; Liberties were destined to become a liability.  Officials were lobbying 
against continued production of the “slow, uneconomical, and relatively poor” 
Liberty ship.  Since the maximum speed of the ships was only around 10 knots, the 
Commission presented them as suitable only for tramp service.57  On the occasion of 
Victory Fleet Day on September 27, 1943, the second anniversary of the launching of 
the first Liberty ship, Admiral Land issued “a report to the American people” stating 
that by the end of 1944, the United States would have fifty million deadweight tons of 
shipping, approximately five times the projected need for foreign and domestic 
trade.58  Land suggested a solution to the problem: keep the faster Victory ships and 
turn over the slower Liberty ships for international disposition.59  The following year 
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on Maritime Day, the Associated Press wrote a feature story on America’s merchant 
marine.  “No longer is interest in America’s maritime life centered in coastal areas 
and port cities, for American taxpayers and bond buyers from coast to coast and 
border to border have an eighteen billion dollar investment in the greatest merchant 
fleet in the world.”  After extolling the accomplishments of the maritime industry 
overall, the article concluded with “Leaders shaping plans for the Merchant Marine 
are determined that the experience of the last war should not be repeated.  Then a 
large share of the Nation’s emergency-built merchant fleet was tied up and to gather 
rust and barnacles and the United States dropped back to a fourth-class maritime 
power.”60  In the November and December 1944, the readers of Forbes magazine 
were treated to an in-depth examination of the entire issue.  The author’s message 
was clear.  Through sheer numbers the United States could remain the world’s 
preeminent maritime nation.  However, America must also rise to the responsibility of 
restoring international trade relations by facilitating the return of world’s merchant 
fleets to an approximation of their prewar levels, thereby encouraging competition 
and free trade.61  Even the academic history community played a role.  The Armed 
Forces Radio Service developed a series of informational radio programs in 
conjunction with the American Historical Association. These programs were designed 
to educate servicemen about important issues of the day.  Entitled GI Roundtable, 
these radio discussions were said to “provide factual information and balanced 
arguments as the basis of discussion of all sides of the question.”  Designation EM 25 
in the series was “What Shall We Do With Our Merchant Fleet?”  The arguments 
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presented were far from balanced, and reflected the stated desires of the g vernment 
and the Maritime Commission to dispose of the Liberty ships.62 
 Policymakers did not rely wholly on propaganda and public opinion to make 
their case.  In June 1944, the Maritime Commission and the U.S. Navy jointly 
contracted with the Graduate School of Business Administration at Harvard 
University to conduct an extensive study of the entire maritime industry.  The 
scholars were asked to examine the historical and current domestic and interational 
maritime situations and come forth with recommendations regarding the size and 
disposition of the American postwar merchant fleet.  For this study, the question went 
beyond the need for some sort of sales or disposal program.  The study was intended 
to include the broader considerations of global maritime economics.   
 The business school had to consider the impact of U.S. actions on four distinct 
shipping markets.  The first was the new building market for vessels.  Here, th  
government was in a position to influence how much new tonnage would be 
constructed based on how it chose to sell and distribute its surplus ships.  The second 
was the freight market.  This is the arena where freight rates are detemined, again 
based on the numbers and availability of “bottoms.”  The major area that the 
government was going to influence was the sale and purchase market.  Regardless of 
how merchant ship disposal was conducted, the numbers and sales price of merchant 
ships worldwide would be pegged to the U.S. ship disposal program.  Finally, the 
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demolition market, that is the price paid for scrapped vessels, would also be 
influenced by the tenets of supply and demand.63 
 Admiral Land had been formulating the legislation necessary to allow sale of 
war-built ships since early 1943.  All of the larger economic considerations had 
already been examined by the Commission and taken into account.64  At he time it 
was ordered, the study which became known as the “Harvard Report,” was intended 
to answer questions that the Commission already knew the answers to.  It appearsthat 
by ordering the study, the Commission was offering itself, the State Department, and 
the Congress a means of justifying its support of a potentially unpopular piece of 
legislation by giving it the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration seal 
of approval. 
 The legislative process began in early 1944.  House Resolution 4486 (78th 
Congress, 2nd Session) “A Bill to Provide for the Sale of Certain Government Owned 
Merchant Vessels, and for Other Purposes” was introduced and sent to the House 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.  In late May and mid-June a totalof five 
days of hearings were held where the committee reviewed the bill and documents 
submitted the Maritime Commission, the Navy Department, and Treasury 
Department.  Based on the recommendations received by the committee, a second bill 
was drafted which became H.R. 5213 (78th Congress, 2nd Session).  Further comments 
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submitted to the committee resulted in a new bill submitted to the 79th Congress as 
H.R. 1425 which retained the title of its predecessors. 
 Each amended version of the bill further honed the authority of the Maritime 
Commission to affect vessel sales, while reinforcing the protective intent of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.  The sales bill was framed as a measure “further 
carrying out the policies declared in Section 101 and the objectives set forth in 
Section 201” of the 1936 Act, and in fact, that is what it did.  The provisions 
regarding foreign sale of vessels were small part of the overall proposal.  The terms 
and conditions regarding charter or sale of vessels to U.S. citizens were much more 
complex because of subsidized versus non-subsidized operators, terms of credit, and 
the numerous tax considerations.  Foreign sales were to be delayed for a period to 
allow U.S. buyers first choice of vessels and foreign purchases were envisioned as 
being on a cash basis.  The bill also had to settle the issue of how the value of the 
surplus vessels of varying types was to be calculated and a final sales price 
established.  In addition, the Navy was vitally interested in maintaining a sufficient 
reserve merchant fleet for national defense purposes, which was made part of the bill.  
Overall, this was a very significant piece of maritime legislation, set forth to provide 
maximum benefit to the entire shipping and shipbuilding industry.   
 Regardless of the potential benefits that the ship sales bill offered to numerous 
interests, two significant problems had to be overcome.  The first was potential 
opposition to the international sale of vessels.  The second, and perhaps even more 
difficult problem, was the total lack of unanimity among the various segments of the




Operators wanted the cheapest vessels and the least amount of competition.  Unions 
wanted the greatest number of jobs at the highest wages.  Shipbuilders wanted 
contracts for new vessels, subsidized by the government if necessary.  These disparate 
interests all came to light in the initial round of hearings.  If any sales bill were to 
make it to the president’s desk for signature, the many U.S. maritime stakeholders 
would have to understand and accept how the legislation would provide a greater 
benefit to them as a whole.  The State Department’s earlier recommendation th  a 
postwar shipping policy be implemented before the end of the war in order to blunt 
potential opposition turned out to be a fanciful notion.  After a concerted effort to 
convince the American public that the Liberty ships were once again “ugly 
ducklings,” and the fact that selling surplus ships was a fiscal necessity, Congress 
treated the issue like a political hot potato. 
 After an initial round of hearings in 1944 on the postwar shipping plan, the 
Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Representative 
Otis Schuyler Bland (D) of Virginia, agreed to allow a certain time period to elapse 
before scheduling hearings on the revised bill.  In a letter to Admiral Land, Bland 
stated that as Land had requested, he had postponed the hearings on a new bill until 
March 1, 1945, in the hopes that the squabbling maritime interests could become 
more unified in support of the bill’s many provisions.  But it was clear from the letter
that nothing had transpired that brought Bland any optimism.  As an apparent 
supporter of the legislation, the Chairman offered Admiral Land a recap of the bill’s 
provisions which most disturbed the committee.  None of them concerned foreign 




offered to subsidized U.S. vessel operators versus independent U.S. operators trying 
to compete against their protected counterparts.  Unfortunately for the Maritime 
Commission and the State Department, before foreign sales could be authorized, the 
terms and conditions of domestic sales had to be hashed out to the satisfaction of the 
disparate interests.  Bland encouraged Land to come to the next round of hearings 
prepared to address the specific points presented in the letter.  “I am submitting these 
observations on the pending bill at the insistence of possible opponents of the present 
bill and with the hope that the Commission’s views may tend to clarification and 
possible removal of opposition though I am not optimistic.  Your consideration of this 
suggested objection to the bill may prove helpful for they will be presented at the 
hearing”65   
 As a politician, Congressman Bland recognized that any plan for selling 
surplus ship sales would be fraught with problems.  The Congress faced the obvious 
political dilemmas; the concerns of an entire maritime industry, the fiscalneeds of the 
government, and the complexities of future requirements.  From the outset, the 
maritime industry as a whole wanted to maintain American dominance in terms of 
deadweight tonnage.  But at the same time, both industry and government analysts 
understood that it was unrealistic to think that U.S. flag vessels could carry more than 
50 percent of the goods the country produced for export.  Considering the nature of 
the goods, bulk commodities such as coal or wheat, or an entire range of 
manufactured goods, the number and type of vessels would have to be carefully and 
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realistically calculated and managed by an industry that was notorious for it  lack of 
cooperation.  At the same time, vessels would have to return to the United States 
loaded with foreign cargo for import at a time when the rest of the world was 
recovering from war.  In addition, American steamship companies had not operated in 
regular commercial commerce during most of the war years.  Their vessels had been 
chartered and operated by the War Shipping Administration in support of the Allied 
war effort.  By the time consideration of a plan for surplus ship sales took place, 
vessel operators were poised to make a big splash, but no one had an idea how big the 
pool was going to be. 
 In spite of Admiral Land’s efforts to draft and present a bill which attemp d 
to equitably address every major aspect of surplus ship sales, disharmony reigned 
within the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries committee and amongst those called 
to testify concerning the proposed legislation.  Two previous attempts at achieving a 
consensus on the various provisions of the bill had failed, prompting Committee 
Chairman Bland to notify Admiral Land that he needed to appear before the 
committee prepared to address each representative’s specific concerns.66   
 The scope of the hearings extended way beyond the bill’s stated purpose.  The 
questions and testimony ranged from complaints about the Interstate Commerce 
Commission regulating coastwise shipping, to what the United States would do if 
British shipping lines were allowed to engage in air travel, something the U.S. Civil 
Aeronautics Board had denied American steamship companies.  Every segment of the 
industry was fixated on their particular concerns.  Commercial shipping companies 
seemed intent on trying to outdo each other in order to gain either competitive 





advantage or somehow blunt their competition.  Labor unions lobbied to preserve 
jobs.  Shipbuilding interests sought to maintain a steady flow of orders.  However, 
above the din of testimony that provided a historical and technical rehash of U.S. 
maritime policy since the time of the First World War, representatives of the 
Maritime Commission and the State Department patiently and persistently testified 
about the need to allow surplus ship sales to foreign interests for the overall benefit of 
the United States.  Through a myriad of special interests, the Maritime Commission 
and the U.S. State Department carefully maneuvered to navigate the foreign sales 
provision through public opinion, around maritime industry concerns, and over any 












Chapter 5: The Push for Legislation 
 
 The hearings in the House of Representatives on the proposed ship Merchant 
Ship Sales Act, H.R. 1425, were conducted in several segments over the course of 
March, April, and May 1945.  Admiral Land was the first person called to testify.  In 
his opening statement, Land was blunt and direct, “In consideration of this bill, 
neither the Congress nor the shipping industry can have their cake and eat it too.”  No 
truer statement was delivered to the committee members during the course of the 
hearings.  Speaking extemporaneously, Land addressed the House Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee concerning the most pressing issues regarding surplus
vessels.  First, the admiral reminded the committee that the bill under consideration 
was necessary to pass control of merchant shipping from the War Shipping 
Administration and the Maritime Commission back to the control of private 
ownership and operation.  Second, he stated that the bill “has a very definite and 
concrete relation to the foreign shipping problems that will develop…”  Third, he 
reminded the representatives that the bill would provide for a reserve fleet of vessels 
for any future wartime needs.  Finally, the maritime commissioner laid out the 
responsibility that Congress had to assume. “The ship disposal bill requires 
Congressional determination of long-range policy; otherwise we may end this war 
with Government ownership and operation of our shipping, to which the Commission 
and its staff in general, and I in particular, are definitely opposed.”67   
                                                
67 House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, M rchant Ship Sales Act:  Hearings 




 Throughout Land’s testimony, he consistently reminded the committee of the 
consequences of inaction.  Aside from the foreign sale of surplus ships, the most 
troublesome issue regarding the huge numbers of vessels that the United States had 
built in the previous three years was what might happen if the government was stuck 
with vessels no one would buy.  The mere thought that the Maritime Commission 
might be forced into a similar position as the United States Shipping Board following 
World War I was sufficient to give the committee pause.  Land knew full well that by 
reminding committee members of the previous government foray into commercial 
shipping operations, he would pique many an unpleasant memory of the ensuing 
investigation and scandal.  The congressmen also were well aware of Britain’s desire 
to recover its role as the world’s leading maritime nation, and the fact that they had 
already established their ship sales policy.  Land warned that without a U.S. foreign 
sales policy, other maritime nations such as Britain would gain a competitive edge in 
replacing the lost tonnage of the European Allies.  To further spur the committee, the 
admiral stated that if the Congress did not act “and give the Commission its ideas of 
policy for the future of the American merchant marine, it is quite evident that other 
agencies will endeavor to take charge of the situation.  Some evidence of that is 
occurring at the present time.”68  The committee chairman, Representative Schuyler 
Otis Bland (D) of Virginia pressed the commissioner to name the “other agencies.”  
Land replied “The Surplus Commodities Agency, the State Department, the Navy 
Department or any other departments that may be interested in surplus or analogous 
matters that pertain to shipping, with special regard to surplus on the one hand and 





foreign policy on the other.”69  With this statement the admiral was teetering on a 
knife edge of truth in that the Surplus Property Act of 1944 already designated the 
Maritime Commission as the sole disposal agency for surplus vessels.  However, the 
Act also set forth a number of specific objectives related to foreign relations.  One 
such statutory provision was “to establish and develop foreign markets and promote 
mutually advantageous economic relations between the United States and other 
countries by the orderly disposition of surplus materials in other countries.”70  This 
provision tied the Commission to the State Department by virtue of the vessels being 
sold having to be declared as surplus materials.  
 Even though the State Department had previously expressed a willingness to 
cooperate with the Commission concerning foreign vessel sales, the Department had 
recently embarked on a reorganization that affected its relationship with Maritime 
Commission, and was of interest to the committee.  The reorganization, announced in 
January 1944, was concurrent with the ever expanding role of the United States in the 
ongoing Allied plans to shape the postwar world.  The focus of top level State 
Department officials was reoriented away from administration and toward “matters of 
important foreign policy.”  To accomplish this goal, two major committees were 
formed, a Policy Committee and a Committee on Postwar Programs.  Both 
committees were tasked with assisting the secretary of state in the consideration of 
major questions of foreign policy and the execution of such policies by means of 
appropriate international agreements.71  As part of this reorganization, the Department 
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established the Office of Transportation and Communications under the directions of 
an assistant secretary of state.  This office was responsible for initiating and 
coordinating policy and action in all matters concerning the international aspects of 
transportation and communications.  Policy issues concerning the sale of ships to 
foreign buyers fell to the Shipping Division of this office.  The duties and 
responsibilities of the Division were delineated in (State) Departmental Order 1301 
which was reviewed by the committee. 
 Of primary concern to the committee members was the extent of the 
jurisdiction that the State Department might attempt to claim over international ship 
sales.  Aside from the responsibility to “analyze, study and recommend,” and provide 
overall policy advice, paragraph 2(e) of the order specifically spoke to vessel sales 
and the Department’s relationship with the Maritime Commission.  “In cooperation 
with the geographic and other interested offices of the Department, conduct 
negotiations between foreign governments and the Maritime Commission and War 
Shipping Administration with regard to disposal of tonnage, transfer of nationality, 
redistribution of ships to essential trade routes, and other shipping matters.”  With this 
directive, the State Department had clearly positioned itself for the eventual pass ge 
of the Ship Sales Act and established a link between the vessel sales and internatio al 
trade routes.  In addition, the previously mentioned provision of the Surplus Property 
Act of 1944 was specifically cited by the State Department in defending its 
involvement in foreign ships sales.72  The directive also outlined the Division’s 
responsibility to cooperate with the Office of Foreign Service regarding matters of 
                                                
72 House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, M rchant Ship Sales Act:  Hearings 




economic or political significance in the maritime and shipbuilding industries of other 
countries.73   The concern about the State Department’s intentions toward ship sales 
was compounded by more recent actions.  The State Department made an ill-timed 
announcement, just days before the hearings began, of an agreement to sell Liberty 
ships to France as part of a French economic recovery plan, which raised concern 
with Admiral Land and the committee members.  The original Lend-Lease Act 
allowed for the transfer of government owned merchant vessels to other countries by 
sale, transfer of title, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise.74  However, the general 
policy of the Executive Branch to date had been that no merchant vessels owned by 
the United States should be transferred to a foreign government during the 
continuance of hostilities except by lease.  With victory in Europe only a matter of 
months away, perhaps the State Department felt that it could assume a more liberal 
interpretation of both the law and past practice. 
 The State Department’s first and only foray into direct ship sales did not quite 
go as planned.  In an effort to provide immediate support for France’s Monnet Plan 
for economic recovery, the Department agreed to sell the French provisional 
government seventy-five Liberty ships under a new lend-lease agreement sign d 
February 28, 1945.  The proposed sale itself was less of an issue than the terms of the 
financing offered to the French.  The agreed upon interest rate of 2 ½ percent on a 
U.S. government-backed loan to finance the sale was lower than the 3 ½ percent rate 
under consideration for domestic purchasers under the proposed sales act.  Soon after 
the hearings commenced, the committee got wind of the State Department’s action
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and the Secretary of State had to mount a hasty retreat.  Rather than trying to ut lize 
the terms of the new French lend-lease agreement, the Secretary announced the 
decision to delay the sale until the ship disposal legislation under consideration 
became law.75 
 With the agencies jockeying for their postwar positions, what remained at 
stake was the definite legislative authority for the Maritime Commission to control 
and direct the ship sales effort in keeping with the mandate of the Merchant Mari e 
Act of 1946.  At this point, there was no real power grab in play, but as Land stated, if 
the Congress delayed too much longer, the State Department or the Navy might 
attempt to decide on the disposition of ships while the Commission acted only as the 
transfer agent.  Even though the Maritime Commission and the State Department had 
pledged cooperation, the admiral wanted to ensure the Commission’s authority by 
statute. 
The U.S. Maritime Commission was the most logical agency to administer the 
program, but the State Department also had a vested interest, an agenda, and 
commitments to fulfill.  The Liberty ship deal for France was merely its most recent 
agreement.  Though it was not a secret, it came to light during the hearings that the 
State Department had previously made agreements with Norway, Brazil, and Chile 
“which provide in general terms for aid in replacement and rehabilitation” of vessels 
utilized or lost in the common war effort.  In the case of Norway, the lend-lease 
agreement with that country contained language conveying “an assurance of the 
willingness of this Government to assist in the rehabilitation of Norway’s merchant 
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fleet.”  For Brazil, the government was obligated to replace vessels lost in the course 
of maintaining shipping services between the United States and Brazil.  Chile had 
sold three vessels to the United States which the State Department had agreed to 
replace after the war.  Having the Sales Act in place would help to ease meeting th se 
commitments.76 
 Committee Chairman Bland invited State Department comments on the 
proposed ship sales legislation.  The newly organized Shipping Division submitted 
the “Report of the State Department on H.R. 1425” under the signature of the Acting 
Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew.  This statement, for the purposes of the record of 
the hearings became Committee Document 12.  The State Department’s stated 
interest in the bill was “its importance to foreign relations.”  The Department further 
advised that “the general policy adopted and developed to govern the post-war sale of 
Government-owned merchant vessels should be in close harmony with the broad 
foreign economic policy which will best serve the national interests of the Unit d 
States.”77  The letter went on to say: 
If the Government of the United States were to attempt to take advantage of 
war losses of other countries and of the wartime increase of is own merchant 
fleet to establish itself in a dominant shipping position, it would be acting 
contrary to its basic policy of promoting sound international economic 
relations and an increasing flow of commerce.78 
 
Basically, this document advocated the elimination of all restrictions on foreign 
purchase and operation of U.S. war-built ships.  Of course, this was not about to 
happen, and the Maritime Commission was not in favor of any policy that extreme.  
The statement did create a bit of a flap in that several congressmen were icensed that 
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the State Department would attempt to dictate shipping policy, which they considered 
the domain of the Maritime Commission.79  However, the State Department and the 
Maritime Commission were sailing on parallel courses, just with somewhat different 
perspectives.  The Commission had an eye on the past while the State Department 
was looking well into the future.  In front of the two stood a number of groups with 
special interests as well as the ever present quagmire of public opinion. 
 The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was faced with trying 
to address the disparate interests of the various commercial carriers who were each 
poised and ready to seize as much post war business as possible with maximum 
advantage over their competition, and without they themselves incurring sacrifice.  
Much of the committee’s time was taken up these matters.  The testimony, views, and 
suggested amendments presented by the commercial maritime industry offered a 
thorough dissection of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the history of the 
industry since the end of the First World War.  The ship operators, their various trade 
groups, maritime unions, and other industry representatives were vocal in their views 
and at the same time chided for their lack of unanimity in terms of creating a 
workable bill.  For the most part, those testifying conceded that there were too many 
vessels and foreign sales, especially of Liberties, were going to be likely and probably 
necessary. 
 While feigning disinterest in the Liberty ships, commercial operators 
uniformly rejected a proposed pricing structure that charged American citizens a 
higher price for the ships than would be paid by a foreigner.  On the surface, it might 
appear puzzling that foreigners would receive a price incentive over Americans.  
                                                




However, keeping in mind the Maritime Commission was the primary author of the 
bill, the motives of the Commission are important as well.  Even before the war was 
officially declared, the Maritime Commission had been directly and heavily in olved 
with the shipbuilding industry.  The nation’s shipbuilding capacity was strategically 
important to national defense.  Land and the Commission were as concerned about 
preserving a viable shipbuilding industry in a postwar environment as they were 
about maintaining a healthy commercial shipping fleet.  
 Without any public admission regarding a strategy, the Commission drafted a 
bill that offered surplus ships at more favorable terms to foreign rather than domestic 
buyers.  The thinking was that if foreign operators bought numerous Liberty ships at 
cheap prices, they would have little incentive to order new vessels from their own 
shipbuilders.  It was hoped that foreign operators would order new specialized vessls 
from American yards that could offer fast delivery.  At the same time, United States 
operators would be encouraged to modernize their fleets and order new vessels from 
U.S. yards using construction differential subsidies.  These factors combined would 
help maintain a strong shipbuilding industry in the postwar year.  The only written 
clue of this strategy exists as a comment on a personal sixty-one page memorandum 
written by an advisor to the State Department Shipping Division.  Entitled “Post War 
Tonnage Distribution and American Merchant Marine Policy,” the memo was 
circulated to the maritime commissioners for review.80  Commissioner S. D. Schell 
wrote “Don’t give away our strategy in selling foreigners our ships – see 46.”  Page 
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forty-six of the memo contained a detailed overview of the benefits of foreign ship 
sales to the domestic shipbuilding industry.  During the round of hearings held in 
May, the president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, H. Gerrish Smith, 
testified on behalf of the shipbuilding industry by stating: “we believe that it is 
urgently necessary to expedite action on this legislation, in order to facilitate the 
transfer of the Government’s surplus ships to private operation on reasonable and 
equitable terms.”81  The Shipbuilders Council was clearly onboard with the Maritime 
Commission and its “hush-hush” strategy to help promote building new ships thus 
preserving the shipyards. 
 Representatives of commercial shipping interests were not vehemently 
opposed to foreign ship sales as long as their positions were protected.  Testimony to 
this effect was given by Almon R. Roth, president of the National Federation of 
Shipping.  This group was composed of companies engaged in non-subsidized 
commercial shipping, which comprised the majority of U.S. vessel operators.  His 
testimony regarding the bill centered on the specific recommendations advance  by 
the members of the federation to protect their postwar positions.  The main concern of 
the group was that a price floor be established to assure that supply and demand 
would not dictate the sale of surplus vessels.  Nearly everyone was confident of the 
supply, but the dynamics of the demand were impossible to forecast.  Roth advocated 
a “fall clause” in the legislation which would set a minimum price for vessels 
assuring potential buyers that their competitors would not be able to purchase ships at
a lower price in the future as demand dwindled.  With such a clause, ship values 
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would be stabilized on the world market.  Roth again reminded the committee of the 
post World War I sales debacle when the United States Shipping Board sold war-built 
ships to U.S. operators at $225 per ton when the British were selling theirs at between 
eighty and ninety dollars per ton, and how by 1922, the USSB was offering the same 
ships to buyers at thirty dollars per ton.  As far as foreign sales were concerned, the 
National Federation of Shipping felt that foreign buyers should have to wait two years 
before being able to purchase any vessels other than Liberties or tankers, res rving 
the faster, more efficient “C” type ships for U.S. shippers only.  In concluding his 
testimony, Roth addressed what he termed “the swelling tide of propaganda” 
regarding necessity of a strong merchant marine for Great Britain, Norway, Holland, 
France and other European nations to generate earnings “to help pay for imports of 
American goods and materials.”82  Roth’s use of the term propaganda was certainly 
valid given the various methods and media employed to sway public opinion 
regarding the necessity of deposing of surplus ships. 
 The State Department was asked to provide testimony before the committee 
on its postwar maritime policy and its role in foreign ship sales.  Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton testified concerning the State 
Department’s written position statement that had previously been provided to the 
committee, as well as some of the international issues that had been raised in other
testimony.  Clayton’s testimony covered the Department’s aborted vessel sales to 
France, British aviation rights, the Department’s advocacy of foreign chartering and 
shipbuilding, and the overall contents of State Department statement regarding the 
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bill which had been designated as Committee Document 12.  As the State Department 
spokesman, Clayton persistently advocated for allowing foreign ship charter and sales 
with the least possible restriction.83  This was consistent with Department’s postwar 
policy proposals.  In a secret document discussing international shipping policy, the 
section concerning the distribution of vessels stated, “If vessels are to be sold or
chartered abroad or built in the United States for foreign account, all nations should
have and equal opportunity to acquire such vessels, except that special consideration 
might be given to those allied countries whose merchant marines have suffered in the 
common effort.”84 
 The Army and the Navy were also vitally interested in any plan involving the 
sale of surplus merchant ships.  When the House committee hearings were held, the 
war was not yet won.  Even though it was clear that it was only a matter of time 
before the Allies would prevail in Europe, there was still grave concern over the war 
in the Pacific.  Both the Army and the Navy were still conducting massive sealift  of 
all manner of war related material and were vitally interested in the size of the current 
fleet as well as the composition of a postwar reserve fleet suited their perceived 
needs.  Not only was there a concern over the sealift required for an invasion of 
Japan, but troops and supplies would need to be shipped from Europe to the Pacific 
theater of operations and eventually back home.  These needs also factored into the 
Commission’s postwar planning which included a reserve fleet of merchant vessels 
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suited for military needs.  Since the U.S. Navy felt that it should have some say 
regarding the disposition of vessels, it asked that the legislation include their rig t to 
review proposed ship sales based on the needs of the military. 
 Over the course of the summer, the maritime world waited for the United 
States to announce its program.  All questions regarding European postwar shipping 
policies received one answer: We are waiting to see what the United States Congress 
decides to do.85  The Europeans, especially the British, were justifiably concerned 
that the United States intended to monopolize world shipping and trade.  They were 
equally concerned that America was not willing to incur the financial losses of the 
disposal of surplus tonnage and that the U.S. would force the “undesirable” Liberty 
ships on the Europeans while keeping the best ships for itself.86 
 The postwar policy plans of the Maritime Commission and the State 
Department were vindicated with the publication in June 1945, of a study ordered by 
the Commission and the U.S. Navy from the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration.  Entitled The Use and Disposition of Ships and Shipyards at the End 
of World War II, the study recommend the quick disposal of Liberty ships at a fixed, 
inexpensive price to both domestic and foreign buyers.  The report justified this 
recommendation using the same arguments that the Maritime Commission had 
previously researched and adopted as preliminary policy.  The report reiterated the 
Commission’s views.  Liberty ships were not choice commercial vessels and shoul  
be priced for quick sale.  Their use throughout the world would help protect the 
interests of domestic shipbuilders because orders for new vessels would likely com 
                                                






at home and abroad as the Liberties were used and replaced.  The U.S. government 
would realize some return on taxpayer investment and the ships would not incur 
further expense by being stored in a reserve status. Finally, the report provided 
forecasts and recommendations about the tonnage that the United States would need 
to handle the demand of postwar commerce, all in concurrence with the Maritime 
Commission’s findings.87  All that remained was for the Senate to take action on the 
bill.   
 For unexplained reasons, the Senate was in no hurry to schedule hearings on 
the measure.  This lack of action was upsetting to the White House.  The Senate 
version of the bill, S 292, was essentially the amended version of H.R. 1425 and 
offered no new provisions that would cause significant debate.  The bill languished 
over the summer of 1945, much to the chagrin of President Truman and Admiral 
Land.  By Labor Day, the Truman administration was eager to begin the disposal 
process in conjunction with the closing out of the numerous lend-lease agreements.  
The president addressed Congress on September 6, 1945, and he reminded them of 
his administration’s desires: 
 Prompt resumption of the normal operation of our merchant marine to 
 expedite the reestablishment of our foreign trade is a major part of general 
 conversion from a wartime to peacetime economy.  The Maritime 
 Commission has already received numerous inquires and applications from 
 potential purchasers of ships at home and abroad for private ownership and 
 operation.  It is recommended that suitable legislation to permit such sale be 
 expedited so that the uncertainty about the disposal of our large surplus 
 tonnage may be removed.  In this way, American shipping companies may 
 undertake commercial operation as rapidly as ships can be released from 
 government control, and the foreign market can also be used for selling those 
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 vessels which are in excess of the needs of our postwar American merchant 
 marine and national defense.88 
 
President Truman was vitally interested in prompt European recovery.  Surplus U.S. 
ships, whether domestically or foreign owned, were key to that effort.  The urgency 
of the president’s appeal to Congress was not based on concern for the domestic 
maritime community.  In late 1945, the administration was carefully watching t e 
political developments in Europe as well as the rising influence of the Communist 
party in France, Italy, Greece and China.  Vessel sales to foreign countries we e a
means for the United States to make a positive political and economic impact.  
Continued delays hampered such foreign relations initiatives. 
 The U.S. Senate hearings on the ship sales bill produced no new debate and 
provided no reason for the delay.  The hearings were held over the last half of 
September and first half of October.  When Admiral Land testified before the 
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, chaired by Senator George L. 
Radcliffe (D-MD), it was made clear to the senators that he, the chief executive, the 
secretary of state, and other vitally interested parties felt that the time for legislative 
action was overdue.  Expressing a concern over the potential loss of foreign sales 
because of the slow-moving bills and making reference to the state of the world 
economy, Land stated: 
 …while I am not an economist or a financier, I have taken this up with 
 prominent gentlemen over the past two or three months, the President of the 
 United  States, the Secretary of State, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Clayton, and the 
 Export-Import Bank, in order to present the merchant marine picture with its 
 direct and indirect implications from blocked currency.  Apologizing for 
 making a statement about something concerning which I know nothing, I 
                                                




 think the keystone of the arch to the peace of the world is stabilized 
 exchange.89 
 
From the spring to the fall of 1945, significant events had transpired that 
added urgency to the debate.  With the unconditional surrender of both Germany and 
Japan in the months since the House committee hearings, the trade balances of war 
ravaged nations were going to become an important measure of their recovery.  In 
addition, the State Department and others were keeping a weary eye on the Russians 
and the rise of local Communist parties.  Both houses of Congress seemed vitally 
interested in the state of the British merchant marine which prior to the war had held 
the number one position in terms of tonnage.  The admiral explained that Great 
Britain, because of its own building and vessels held under lend-lease would not be as 
desperate to buy as countries such as Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Greece, 
and France.90  When being closely questioned about the provisions of the bill, Land 
said “All I can say is go back to World War I, if you knows a better ‘ole, go to it.” He 
made it clear to the senators that he and the Commission had been working on this 
bill since 1942 and political bickering over insignificant details of the bill had equat d 
to two years without a much needed policy.91  In addition to testimony similar to what 
he had presented to the House, Land invoked the Harvard Report to further bolster his 
testimony and convince the Senate committee of the merits of having a law in place. 
Speaking the in the strongest terms, the admiral stated: 
 In my judgment—and I have studied the Harvard Business Report, and the 
 best part of it is in the appendix, showing that the history of our merchant 
 marine legislation is nothing of which any of us can be proud—this is one way 
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 to attempt to cure the handling of the American Merchant Marine.  It is 
 congressional policy—it will be respected by the country, the Comptroller 
 General, and by the people.92 
 
Other testimony before the committee was given primarily by industry representatives 
and followed in the same vein as the testimony given before the House committee.  
The State Department was not called to testify before the senators.  There wer  no 
revelations or significant amendments to the bill.  The Senate hearings on the measure 
concluded on October 19, 1945.  The compromise bill was not hammered out until 
February 1946.  The House voted 233 to 115 in favor of the final bill on February 27.  
The measure was sent to the White House and signed by President Truman on March 
8, 1946.   
 The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 emerged from the legislative process 
with most of the provisions for foreign vessel sales that the Maritime Commission 
and the State Department had advocated.  Foreign operators were not allowed to 
charter vessels, but the purchase provisions were well within reach of most countries.  
The various types of war-built vessels were offered for sale at statutory sales prices 
that allowed for adjustment depending on a vessel’s condition.  However, a floor 
price was established as the minimum cost for each type of ship.  This protected 
potential buyers from future price reductions.  The vessels could be bought for cash 
or financed with a 25 percent down payment.  There was a ninety-day waiting period 
to allow domestic purchasers to have first choice of the available vessels.  After that 
foreign buyers could purchase Liberty and Victory dry cargo ships and T-2 tankers, if 
available. 
                                                




 By the time that the Merchant Marine Sales Act of 1946 became law, Admiral 
Land had resigned his post as Maritime Commission chairman.  However, the 
Commission remained committed to disposing of surplus vessels, especially Libert
ships.  The State Department assumed an active role in arranging and expediting the 
sales in conjunction with their particular policy goals for a given country. 
No sooner did the Act become law, than the world situation began to 
dramatically change.  The countries of Europe continued to sink deeper into 
economic despair, prompting widespread political unrest.  Relations between Russia 
and her former Allies also began to deteriorate.  While the Maritime Commission and 
the State Department were working toward placing ships in foreign hands for their 
economic well-being, the State Department was also monitoring the fluctuating 
political climate in a number of countries around the world that were important to 











Chapter 6: The World Receives Ships 
 
The Sales Act and its Implications 
 The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 designated the U.S. Maritime 
Commission as the government agency responsible for administering the sale of 
merchant vessels under the terms of the Act.  Three weeks before the Act became 
law, key members of the State Department Shipping Division met with their 
counterparts at the Maritime Commission to work out the details of their cooperative 
efforts toward facilitating ship sales to foreign interests.  In a memorandum of 
conversation made by the Department of State, the participants pledged “the 
establishment of a close liaison between the Department and the Maritime 
Commission for the clearance of questions as to the policy with respect to the sale of 
ships to foreign governments and nationals of foreign governments.”  The group 
discussed the competitive situation that was arising among nations vying for vessels.  
The State Department was particularly concerned about Italy, and its repre entatives 
made it clear “that it is the policy of the Department to get Italy back on its feet as 
soon as possible, and in order to do this Italy, among other things, needed ships…”93  
The State Department’s position in this case was to argue for the sale of better surplus 
ships versus the return of old Italian vessels seized when hostilities were declare .  
There was also discussion about sales to nations such as Argentina and Spain that 
avoided direct involvement in the hostilities.  The concern, voiced by the State 
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Department, was that if nations such as these were to be denied sales by the United 
States, the British could furnish vessels through its sales program and negate th  
effect of any U.S. sanction.  Though not addressed at this meeting, the Department 
had an overarching concern about trade with “the Americas.”  The Good Neighbor 
Policy initiated by President Roosevelt, coupled with the desire of the United Stat s
to assume a broader range of involvement in the affairs of its neighbors to the south, 
prompted a separate examination by the State Department of ways with which to 
influence the region through ship sales and trade. 
 Finally, the meeting addressed the most important topic which was the issue 
of financing the sales.  The Ships Sales Act stipulated that foreign interests could 
purchase vessels for cash or on credit by placing 25 percent down and financing the 
balance due.  The paradox created was that war-torn European countries were short of 
U.S. dollars and the Export-Import Bank had indicated that it would not authorize 
loans to finance the purchase of surplus ships.  The expectation was that the Maritime 
Commission would make funds available from its own accounts.  This opened 
another avenue of collaboration for the two organizations.  The State Department 
agreed to ascertain the creditworthiness of countries and individuals requesting loans, 
saying that they could provide “a wealth of information on such matters and that 
reasonable promptness could be expected in the obtaining such information.”94  With 
a relationship firmly established, both the Department and the Commission prepared 
to move forward with ship sales. 
 Because the Maritime Commission began receiving requests from potential 
foreign buyers well before the Sales Act was signed into law, the Commission acted 





to clarify the propriety of foreign sales to both Allied and former Axis countries.  This 
clarification, aside from the issue of legality, would also inhibit potential chalenges 
to foreign ship sales by U.S. shipping interests and allow the Commission to have its 
actions and opinions placed on record.  Immediately after the Act was signed into 
law, the Commission directed a letter to the secretary of state requesting a review of 
the Act in light of Italy’s request for fifty Liberty ships.  The concern raised by the 
Commission was based on the possible violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act 
of 1917 due to the fact that a formal peace treaty had not yet been signed with Italy.95  
On July 25, 1946, the Commission laid out its position based on a full legal review of 
the Sales Act and concluded that it had no legal basis to impede sales to foreign 
buyers as long as they met the terms and conditions of the Act and did not harm the 
larger national interest.96 
  The State Department during this period was not at all concerned with legal 
clarifications and viewed foreign ship sales as decidedly in the national interest.  The 
Truman administration was vitally interested in a speedy European economic 
recovery.  One of the key aspects of the success of this recovery was the resumption 
of international commerce and trade.  The merchant fleets of nations such as France,
Italy, and Greece had been decimated by the war.  Whether seized, captured, or 
destroyed, nearly the entire merchant ship tonnage of these nations was unavailable 
for their commercial use after the war.  The United States now offered the means for 
restoring a large part of that tonnage. 
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 Events in early 1946 raised concerns about the spread of Communism and the 
specter of Soviet influence among the nations of Europe and the rest of the world.  In 
February, Joseph Stalin gave a public address celebrating the resiliency of the S viet 
Communist system and the plans for his county’s future.  The ideological tone of the 
speech caused some in Washington to fear Soviet expansion.  Stalin’s address was 
soon followed by Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech and George F. Keenan’s 
famous “long telegram” from Moscow, which by many accounts marked the 
beginning of the Cold War.  The sale of surplus U.S. merchant ships was thus poised 
to become an important part of the U.S. policy to aid and rebuild war-ravaged nations 
in the early years of that ideological struggle. 
 
Liberties bring food, fuel and stability to France 
 Just before V-E Day, it was clear to French leader General Charles de Gaull  
that there were but two real powers in the world: the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  Since both countries were allies of France, de Gaulle regarded each of them
as potential partners in ensuring the survival of his recently liberated country.  
Perhaps cognizant of the forthcoming American-Soviet ideological struggle, the 
General indicated to the U.S. Ambassador to France that if necessary he would work 
with the Soviets, but would prefer to work with the United States.  According to 
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, de Gaulle complained of the U.S. failure to supply 
coal, raw materials for industrial production, and various other supplies.  He then 




you are right:  but she would not fail if you helped her.”97  This was not a threat, but 
rather a desire on General de Gaulle’s part to exercise some control over the future o  
France through an indirect invitation to the United States to help and protect his 
country in the postwar period.98  Perhaps this level of rhetoric was partly induced by 
the State Department’s decision to hold back on their agreement signed in February 
1945 to sell seventy-five Liberty ships to France.  France was desperate for th se 
vessels and was undoubtedly frustrated that the sale was being delayed for political 
reasons.  According to a French maritime journal, the country had lost 60 percent of it 
merchant shipping measured in gross tons.  The addition of the American Liberty 
ships would bring them to within 76 percent of their 1939 total.  However, the French 
were not standing idly by.  They were also purchasing ships from other countries, as 
the Maritime Commission had warned the House committee could occur while the 
legislation languished during 1945.  Ships had been purchased or were on order from 
Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and Holland totaling nearly s ven 
hundred thousand gross tons.  In addition, the French had chartered thirteen Liberty 
ships representing ninety-three thousand addition gross tons. As of June 1, 1946, the 
French claimed a total of 289 ships of varying types. 99 
In October 1945, de Gaulle was elected president of the French provisional 
government.  French leaders acted wherever possible to boost the country’s 
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international prestige and influence despite its limited economic ability and 
dependence on the United States for aid.  In addition, the French people strongly 
desired to restore their nation’s dignity and national identity.  After the Yalta 
Conference, France accused the “Big Three” powers of dividing Europe into spheres 
of influence to the detriment of smaller and medium size European countries.  France
as an advocate for these countries was straying beyond U.S. control.  France’s attempt 
to form a coalition of these countries within the United Nations General Assembly 
was one of the factors that led to France being made one of the five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council.100   
 With this accomplished, France was able to restore some of its power and 
prestige.  However, France’s political stability still depended on American aid, 
diplomatic support and some kind of partnership.101  When Harry S. Truman became 
president, France received a greater level of diplomatic recognition.  In mid 1945, the 
president received the French ambassador and two months later, General de Gaulle.  
The French president appealed directly to President Truman for more American 
economic assistance.  The result was the Blum-Byrnes accords of the following year. 
 The issue of French political stability remained in the minds State Department 
officials.  President de Gaulle moved forward a program of economic reforms and 
modernization.  However, he grew frustrated with the political factionalism of the 
Constituent Assembly that was finding agreement on a new constitution difficult.  
Amid the debate, de Gaulle resigned in early January 1946.  At the end of the month, 
the French Foreign Ministry designated Leon Blum Ambassador Extraordinary to 
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negotiate economic and financial agreements with the United States and secure 
urgently required imports.  The tentative agenda for the negotiations included U.S. 
companies in France, commercial policies, financial arrangements for credit, and 
settlement of lend-lease accounts.  Secretary of State James F. Byrnes pledged “to 
give every appropriate assistance to the development of a sound reconstruction 
program.”102 
 The advice offered by Ambassador Caffery in Paris to the secretary of state 
was based on what Caffery perceived as political and economic practicalities.  A 
cable in early February stated that he believed it was in the U.S. national interest to 
grant France substantial dollar credit in order to help stem the depletion of their dollar 
and gold reserves.  Noting that the country must import nearly everything it needs,
and that so-called “extremists” were poised to exploit the failure of the curr nt 
government, Caffery advocated for the aid package to restore industry and to permit 
the importation of wheat and coal in order to help demonstrate the French 
government’s ability serve the people.103 
 The secretary of state and Ambassador Blum met on March 19.  The subject 
of coal dominated the discussion.  Blum emphasized that France required coal from 
the United States in order to fuel its industries.  Limited domestic coal productin and 
a quota on coal from Germany were cited as the cause of the shortfall.  It was noted 
that France needed to import coal in from the U.S. -- expensive to pay for in dollars -- 
and ship in U.S. vessels.  The ambassador stated that France’s entire reconstruction 
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depended on obtaining coal.  The aid that France needed would help resolve this 
problem, he asserted.104 
 Through the remainder of the spring, France and the United States negotiated 
the terms of an agreement for approximately sis hundred fifty million dollars in loan 
guarantees.  All the while, the U.S. kept a wary eye on political developments in 
France.  A new constitution failed to win approval in a nationwide vote and the 
position of the French Communist Party was weakened as a result.105  This eased U.S. 
concerns over the rising political power of the Communist Party, which had been 
striving to form a communist-dominated coalition government.  With the political 
situation in France somewhat stabilized, the State Department was able to see the 
talks through to a generally satisfactory outcome.  
 The Blum-Byrnes accords between the United States and France were 
approved by President Truman on May 28.  The agreement was composed of only six 
main points.  Included with the loan guarantees and agreements for payments was 
Item 4, a provision for the French to purchase approximately seven hundred fifty 
thousand tons of merchant shipping owned by the United States government under 
the Merchant Marine Sales Act of 1946.106  The very same day, the U.S. Maritime 
Commission met and authorized the sale of as many as seventy-five Liberty ships to 
the French Government.107 
 Although six hundred fifty million dollars in loan guarantees were important 
to French recovery, the sale of Liberty ships was absolutely crucial for resuming 
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export and import commerce.  The French reconstruction plan was centered on 
restoring the nation’s economy in a manner in which French exporters could compete 
internationally.108  With the government able to restore its merchant tonnage to within 
10 percent of its prewar levels, the French vessels could earn money at either spot or 
charter rates, and therefore offset some of the drain on its monetary reserves.  The 
sale of merchant vessels under the Act of 1946 by no means saved France from its 
postwar economic difficulties.  It did however permit the timely sale of vessels, each 
capable of delivering approximately ten thousand tons of coal, wheat, or any other 
consignment of dry cargo, thereby contributing to the nation’s economic recovery.  In 
this way, the Blum-Byrnes accords demonstrated the U.S. commitment to France 
during a formative period for a new French government.  With aid on the way, the 
French people rejected a Communist attempt to assume power, while the oppositin 
Socialists, who were more centrist, continued to support of the United States.  
However, the U.S. left nothing to chance.  Item 5 of the accord required as condition 
of U.S. acceptance: 
 A statement of the French government expressing its full agreement with the 
 principles of the United States’ proposals on world trade and employment, and 
 an expression of the intention to work together with the United States 
 Government in securing general international support for these proposals in 
 the forthcoming conference of the United Nations.  The two governments 
 have also reached understandings on other important related matters of a 
 commercial policy nature.109 
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Clearly, the United States wanted to cement a partnership with the French.  By t e 
fall of 1946, France had adopted a new constitution. 
 
Vessel Sales Boost Italy and Suppress Communism 
 During the period of political turmoil in France, the Council of Foreign 
Ministers, created at the Potsdam Conference, engaged in negotiating the Italian 
Peace Treaty.  Italy was treated differently from other defeated ntions as a result of 
the armistice it signed in 1943, and its subsequent cooperation with the Allies.  Even 
before the negotiations began, the United States adopted a policy of building Italy 
into a stable, democratic nation with a market-oriented socio-economic system.110  As 
the Cold War unfolded, the United States became even more committed to these goals 
with the added concern of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean region.  After the 
overthrow of Mussolini, Italy formed a provisional government and coalition 
Consultive Assembly that was composed of several factions which included Socialist 
and Communist political parties.  Driven by severe postwar economic conditions, the 
Christian Democrats formed a minority government in April 1947 that excluded 
Socialist and Communist participation in the cabinet.  This placed Italy in the hands 
of a centrist government whose Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi was amenable to 
the support of the United States.111   
 In the year prior to the establishment of De Gasperi’s government, the Italian 
Peace Treaty had been successfully negotiated and approved by the Western powers. 
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Ratification of the Italian treaty was vital in light of the developing Cold War 
between the United States and Russia.  During this same period, the Eastern 
Mediterranean became an area of U.S. concern regarding Soviet direct influence.  
Overtures made by the U.S.S.R. toward Turkey about alterations in the rules that 
governed ship movements through the Dardanelles set off a flurry of activity aimed t 
stopping the Soviets from establishing a military presence in Turkey.  This was 
occurring as Italy and the United States were in conflict with Yugoslavia over the port 
of Trieste, an issue tentatively resolved in the Italian Peace Treaty.  During this 
transition period for Italy, the United States furthered its goals of democracy, 
stability, and regional security by providing aid, support for loans, and Liberty ships
to this Mediterranean nation. 
 Though a former member of the Axis, Italy was not denied the opportunity to 
reestablish its commercial fleet.  The Italian government asked the Unitd States for 
ships as early as 1945 to help speed its postwar reconstruction.112  O ce the Merchant 
Ship Sales Act became law, Italy moved quickly to purchase Liberty ships.  The first 
sale occurred on October 31, 1946, with the Italian government purchasing forty ships 
with an option for ten more, on behalf of private Italian shipping firms.113  Within a 
year, various Italian shipowners purchased forty more, as well as a few T-2 tankers.   
 In early 1947, the United States was eager to help ease political and social 
unrest in Italy.  After establishing a new government, Italian Prime Minister De 
Gasperi traveled to the U.S. to visit with and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.  The 
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prime minister described his country as in the throes of an economic as well as a 
political crisis with the greatest pressure being exerted by the Communist Party in an 
effort to bring Italy into the orbit of Russian influence.114  In order to combat this 
threat, the Italian leader pressed for continued financial assistance, loans, wheat, coal, 
and ships.  The first order of fifty ships had been processed quickly as part of the 
initial push to distribute the vessels to European nations.  Now the Italians anticipated 
the need for more. 
 Testing the waters through diplomatic channels, the Italian ambassador met 
with State Department officials about the purchase of another fifty Liberty ships.  
Undersecretary of State William L. Clayton promised that he would take up the 
matter personally with the Maritime Commission and lend State Department support 
to the forthcoming request.  He stated “that he considered it desirable for the Italians 
to attain their prewar shipping tonnage level as quickly as possible, in order to 
alleviate the drain on their foreign exchange.”115  Clayton was as good as his word.  A 
few days later he met with the Maritime Commission and recommended that they 
approve the sale of fifty additional ships to the Italians “promptly so that a public 
announcement thereof might be made about January 17, when the prime minister of 
Italy returned home from his trip to the United States.”  The Commission 
unanimously approved the sale in principle.116 
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 A few months after the Italian delegation returned home, the Italian 
Ambassador to the United States met directly with the new Secretary of State George 
C. Marshall to discuss the situation in his home country.  He fed the United States’ 
fears of what Italy might become.  The Communists had spent heavily and achieved 
some success in recent elections.  Since Italy shared a border with Yugoslavia, an 
easy path of Communist infiltration existed.  The ambassador warned that a 
Communist Italy would provide Moscow with a highly strategic position with which 
to influence the politics of Greece and Turkey, as well as those of Western Europe 
and North Africa.  Of course these possibilities were stated in conjunction with 
continued pleas for aid.  In presenting his case, the Italian ambassador gave the 
impression that the Communists could be held at bay by the psychological effects of 
U.S. aid and support.  This discussion between Ambassador Tarchiani and the 
secretary further emphasized Italy’s need for merchant vessels, including tankers, 
which the U.S. soon provided.117   
 The delivery of Liberty ships to Italy was met with a great deal of 
enthusiasm.118  Contrary to the views held by shipping interests in the United States, 
Italian owners found the Liberty ships quite modern.  One former owner recalled, 
“The Liberty, with its simplified technology was an enormous advance for us.  Until 
that time, shipowners had been very traditionalist, bound to old technologies and 
methods…Studying the Liberties, we learned to change our ways and improve our 
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methods.”  The U.S. permitted these purchases on very liberal terms, requiring only 
25 percent of the five hundred sixty thousand dollar purchase price as down payment 
per ship, and then holding the mortgage based on the exchange rate for 1946.  The 
new owners did well with their new vessels, first acquiring charters to carry much 
needed U.S. wheat and coal to their homeland in the immediate postwar years, and 
later in general world trade.  Many of these vessels continued in service into the 
1960s.119 
 Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi managed to guide the Italian Peace Treaty 
through the Italian Constituent Assembly in the fall of 1947.  In early 1948, the U.S. 
negotiated a new postwar trade agreement with the Italian government.  By the
Italian’ own admission, their economy at the time was able to produce little, if any, 
products for export.  At that point, Italy was entirely dependent on imports, much of 
which came from the United States.  In order to support a continued flow of trade, the 
United States and Italy signed a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation.  
Continued U.S. support bolstered the Christian Democratic government, and the 
United States considered the peace treaty the beginning of a new era for Italy. 
 
Greece Becomes a Maritime Power With Surplus Ships 
 Because of political events and outcomes in Italy, the United Stated gained a 
clearer vision regarding its postwar security interests in the region.  Soon, events in 
Greece and Turkey were brought to the forefront of American concern.120  As the 
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Merchant Ship Sales Act was being reconciled in committee, the U.S. State 
Department was organizing a credit package for Greece through the Export-Import 
Bank that included money for ship sales “which presumably will be available to 
Greece.”121  After the Act was signed, Greece followed a route similar to that of Italy 
in addressing its shipping problem directly to the State Department, asking for the 
assistance of the United States in obtaining merchant ships for Greece eith r directly 
from the U.S. or through a third party.  The secretary of state indicated that the Sta e 
Department would remember the Greek government when the time came.122 
 Postwar conditions in Greece presented significant difficulties for the former 
Allies.  From 1945 to 1947, Greece received three hundred fifty million dollars in 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Aid (UNRRA) which helped domestic 
agriculture and infrastructure rebuilding.  However, Greece was hampered by a weak 
government that was rife with corruption and bogged down in a civil war with a 
Communist supported left-wing opposition.123   
 In October 1946, the acting secretary of state notified the U.S. ambassador to 
Greece that deteriorating internal conditions and the tensions in northern Greecehad 
inspired a reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Greece.  This policy was summarized in 
twelve distinct points.  Each was intended to further the U.S. interests in terms of 
supporting the territorial and political integrity of Greece, and to assure continued 
Greek independence.  On this list was “appropriate action to relieve the Greek 
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shipping crisis through the sale or charter of U.S. vessels.”  As significant was the 
policy of “assisting Greece by finding export markets and in acquiring essential goods 
in U.S. markets.”124 
 In early 1947, the British notified Washington that by the end of March they 
would no longer be able to sustain a presence in Greece supporting an elected 
government engaged in a civil war against armed forces controlled by Communists.  
American was fearful that if the Greek Communist Party gained power, other 
countries in the region such as France and Italy would become subject to the same 
political fate.125  During the same period, the Soviets attempted to lure the Greeks into 
bilateral trade relations by offering to supply large quantities of goods in exchange for 
the rights to a small port on the island of Dodecanese as a repair base for Soviet 
merchant ships.126  Concurrently, Russia was also trying to gain influence with 
Turkey by requesting a revision of the Montreux convention to allow joint Soviet-
Turkish defense of the Dardanelles, the strait between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean.  The U.S. State Department pressed Turkey to resist the Soviet 
pressure and the U.S. dispatched warships to the region.127  The deteriorating 
situation in the Mediterranean was unacceptable to the Truman Administration which,
by the spring of 1947 had launched both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. 
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 Where the Marshall Plan would serve as the master European recovery plan, 
the Truman Doctrine originated as a broad-based appeal to the Congress for aid to 
both Greece and Turkey.  Other European nations appeared to be falling in line with 
United States plans and policies, but a weak Turkish government and a Greek civil 
war threatened the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean region.  Western funds, 
advisors and equipment were sent to Greece to support the war against Communist 
forces.  In late 1949, a cease-fire agreement ended the civil war in favor of an elected 
government. 
 During this critical period, the U.S. dispensed commercial as well as military 
aid to the Greek government.  The U.S. Maritime Commission agreed to sell one 
hundred Liberty ships to Greece under much the same terms given to Italy.  In this
case, the State Department directly assisted the Greeks by notifying the Maritime 
Commission that the sale was “decidedly in the national interest.”  The urgency of the 
sale was further indicated in the Commission’s proviso that the body would give 
preference to buyers who accepted vessels “as is” and agreed to carry a load coal or 
grain on the outward voyage from the United States; conditions Greek shipowners 
were willing to meet.128  To further facilitate the sale, the Greek government 
guaranteed the loans made to their shipowners.  The Greeks made the United States 
its main trading partner, taking full advantage of the worldwide tramp steamer trade 
as well as the movement of U.S. aid cargoes to Greece. 
 The U.S. pledge to assist Greece in finding export markets manifested itself in 
the form of Greek shipping companies registering some of their vessels under foreign
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flags.  That, in turn, allowed the Greeks to utilize lower-cost foreign crews and 
avoided higher domestic taxes.  In the postwar years, the idea of “flags of 
convenience” became a common American shipping practice.  In cooperation with 
the Greek ship operators, U.S. controlled vessels could enjoy the advantages of low-
cost operation while competing on the open market.  This limited American flagged 
vessels to the rate-controlled liner services to and from the United Stateswhil  
Greece operators engaged in the cross-trade between various foreign countries using 
the convenience flags of Liberia and Panama.  This practice, for all practical 
purposes, eliminated U.S. flag shipping from tramp shipping and the bulk trades, and 
brought significant revenue to the owners of these vessels.  
 It has since been calculated that the one hundred Liberties sold to Greek ship 
owners generated a combined income of thirty-five million dollars with a net profit of 
about eleven million dollars in 1947 alone.  In later years, the U.S. government sold 
Greek shippers seven T-2 tankers that, using the same business acumen, they parlayed 
into the worlds largest tanker fleet.129  Not only did postwar foreign policy assist 
Greece in resisting Communist intervention and influence, it promoted trade policy 
that enriched both Greek shippers and their American business colleagues operating 
vessels under flags of convenience. 
 
Argentina Creates a Merchant Marine 
 The U.S. State Department’s dealings with Argentina regarding trade matters 
and ship sales provides an early glimpse into how foreign policy would be used in the 
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postwar years to affect the decisions of foreign leaders.  Though not dictated by the 
imminent threat of Communist expansion, the State Department’s actions in 
Argentina were just as politically motivated.  South American countries in general 
were heavily dependent on imports from industrialized countries because of their lack 
of industrial base.  However, they were exporters of food stuffs and raw materials 
essential to the Allied war effort.  In order to maintain a reasonable trade balance 
during the war years, the State Department, in cooperation with the War Shipping 
Administration, instituted “trading programs” with the countries of South America.   
 The trading programs stipulated the amount of U.S. produced goods that 
would be allowed for export to South America as well as the amounts of goods and 
material that the various countries would ship to the United States and the Allies.  
Since the War Shipping Administration controlled the booking and scheduling of 
cargo shipments during the war, South American countries such as Argentina were at 
the mercy of the United States for a majority of their trade and cargo movements.  
The Argentine government, which for most of the war years was under the control of 
a military dictator, had little choice but submit to the controls put in place by the U.S. 
government, but refused to cut diplomatic ties with the Axis powers.  This refusal to 
bend to the will of the United States prompted the State Department to consider 
economic means to affect a change in Argentine policy. 
 Once the United States entered World War II, its domestic security depended 
on keeping hostile forces out of the hemisphere.  In the wake of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, a majority of the nations in the Americas either broke diplomatic relations 




until later in 1942.  Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Paraguay chose to remain neutral 
for as long as it was feasible.  The U.S. trading programs with Central and South 
American countries allowed the United States to buy and control the supply of all 
types of goods valuable to the war effort and deny them to the Axis.  At the same 
time, the exporting countries received U.S. dollars and could buy goods from 
America on a regulated flow based on the overall needs of the war effort. 
 To further economically isolate South and Central American nations, the 
United Stated acted to eliminate any form of commerce between the hemisp re and 
the Axis powers.  The Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American 
Republics was held in January 1942 in Rio de Janeiro.  The efforts of the attendees 
were directed toward hemispheric solidarity and mutual defense.  One of a number of 
resolutions adopted at the meeting called for participating nations to sever all 
commercial and economic intercourse with Germany, Italy and Japan.  The United
States delegation left the meeting pleased with the scope of the final agreement.130  
However, soon after the meeting, problems arose between the United States and 
Argentina when it became clear that the Argentine government was not being 
forthright about complying with the terms of the resolution. 
 Argentina had declared itself neutral in the war and maintained its diplomatic 
relations with the Axis.  Since Argentina chose that course, the Axis powers appeared 
to avoid any action that would provoke them to declare war.  By the same token, 
Argentina avoided specific action against the Axis.  The fact that most of their trade 
was in support of the Allied war effort was not viewed as unexpected given the 
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geopolitical necessities.  However, as unobtrusively as possible, Argentina continued 
to execute financial transactions through Switzerland, Spain, and occupied France, 
and continued debt payments to firms and institutions with Axis connections.131   
 Argentina’s continued financial dealings with the Axis rankled the State 
Department.  In May 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested to President 
Roosevelt that Argentina’s funds in the United States be frozen and transactions 
allowed only for licensed Argentine trade transactions.  The purpose for this action 
was clearly and directly stated: “to coerce Argentina into greater collaboration with 
the war effort of the United Nations,” and “to demonstrate to all the other American 
countries that the United States Government ‘means business’ and will wield its huge 
economic power to force more effective collaboration.”  Roosevelt rejected the 
proposal as “not in accord with the good neighbor policy.” 132  Argentina was made 
aware of this proposal and in spite of its rejection by FDR, did make some effort to 
placate the United States.  In mid-1942, a number of decrees were issued that 
addressed foreign financial transactions but their implementation was never fully 
realized. 
 Strategic necessity dictated that trade between Argentina and the Allies 
remain uninterrupted through 1942 and 1943.  The United States was importing as 
much Argentine oil as production would allow and Great Britain was heavily 
dependent on food stuffs such as meat.  In 1943, the United States received 
$151,593,000 in goods from Argentina, and Great Britain in excess of one hundred 
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million dollars.133  In terms of exports, the United States adopted a policy in March 
1943 which instituted limits on U.S. shipments to Argentina and encouraged the 
Allies to find alterative sources in South America for the goods Argentina 
produced.134  This recommendation was made in anticipation of the elimination of the 
restrictive trade programs in the Americas. As the war was being won and stockpiles 
of materials beginning to grow, it was no longer necessary for the United Stat s to so 
strictly control the flow of trade. However, when the proposal was presented to the 
President by the State Department for his approval, it specifically excluded 
Argentina.135 
 By early 1944, the State Department was growing increasingly irritated with 
the Argentine regime.  The U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aries characterized the 
regime as “irresponsible and self-seeking military and nationalist elements,” and a 
“government composed of largely of undisciplined army officers, self-seeking army 
politicians and fanatic nationalists.”136  Correspondence between Washington and the 
Embassy discussed in detail the varying effects that the curtailment of trade would 
have on Argentina’s industry and economy.  In spite of their desire to inflict some 
                                                
133 Argentine Import-Export Programs, June 29, 1944, Subject Files 1940-1948; Shipping 
Policy Files; Office of Transportation and Communications, Shipping Division; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, 
College Park, MD. 
134 Economic Policy Towards Argentina, March 4, 1943, Subject Files 1940-1948; Shipping 
Policy Files; Office of Transportation and Communications, Shipping Division; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, 
College Park, MD. 
135 Secretary of State to the President, February 9, 1944, Subject Files 1940-1948; Shipping 
Policy Files; Office of Transportation and Communications, Shipping Division; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, 
College Park, MD. 
136 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 





form of economic pain on the country, the State Department did not want it made 
public in order to limit objections by U.S. interests, and in the event sanctions did not 
produce any noticeable difference in Argentine conduct.137 
 On September 9, 1944, the State Department formally declared a more 
restrictive trade policy with Argentina and requested that the War Shipping 
Administration assign no more vessels to carry northbound cargo from Argentina to 
Allied countries.  This left the Argentine merchant marine on its own to supply the 
countries needs.  Efforts to keep the change in policy quiet were a complete failure.  
News wire services carried the story and the Argentine press lambasted the United 
States for harming the entire country and imposing what amounted to defacto trade 
sanctions.138  The policy remained in effect until February 3, 1945, when it was 
quietly revised to relax the restrictions imposed the previous September.  There had 
been another regime change in late 1944 that the United States chose to recognize.  In 
addition, the U.S. had encountered a great deal of pressure from its Allies drop the 
policy.  Argentine meat and grains were desperately needed to feed Europe and 
additional ships were required to transport it.  Setting aside their desire to stop 
Argentine foreign financial dealings, the State Department agreed to the change 
saying, “we hope to be able to modify the present arrangements by a gradual 
relaxation rather than take action so suddenly as to become unnecessarily 
conspicuous.”139  On March 28, 1945, Argentina finally declared war on Japan and 
Germany, removing the only concrete reason for the United States not to fully support 
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the new military regime.  In April, the secretary of state announced that Argentina 
had taken measures to reaffirm its solidarity with the other American republics and 
that America’s current economic policy toward Argentina was comparable to that f 
its neighbors.  As a result, Argentina was granted Allied status and officially 
recognized as part of the United Nations war effort.140 
 When the United States tightened export controls, the policy had a direct 
effect on Argentine shipping.  Nearly all of the cargo bound for South American 
countries was being shipped through ports in the Gulf of Mexico to reduce the 
likelihood of German U-boat attack.  The cargo destined for Argentina was for the 
most part being carried on the Argentine State Shipping Line, Flota del Mercante 
Estado.  The economics of commercial vessel operation dictates that cargo ships 
ideally have full holds in both directions of a voyage to maximize revenue.  The 
export restrictions against Argentina caused their vessels to make the return voyage
home with minimal cargo, thus forcing a net reduction in the monies gained from its 
export trade to the United States.  In this way, the United States still received needed 
Argentine goods.  Argentina in turn received dollars for the shipments, and the U.S. 
made its point by denying the county all but essential materials required to support 
their contribution to the war effort, and at the same time forced inefficient operation 
of their vessels. 
 Argentina was hampered by the size and state of its fleet.  Prior to 1941, 
Argentina had no organized merchant marine.  There were small private companies 
engaged in coastal shipping and an independent tanker company, but no national 
cargo carrier.  That changed with the outbreak of the Second World War.  Concurrent 
                                                




with what had occurred in the United States, countries wanting to avoid the risk of 
losing their vessels to German U-boat attack or other hostile actions left their ships 
idle in Argentine ports.  The government of Argentina took the same action as the 
United States and passed the laws necessary to allow acquisition of these vess ls.  In 
March 1941, Acting President General Ramón Castillo created an advisory 
commission to investigate “the possible acquisition, lease, or requisition” of the 
vessels that were clogging the ports of the River Platte.141  In August, Argentina 
entered into an agreement to purchase all of the Italian general cargo ships stranded in 
Argentine waters.  This gave Argentina an instant merchant fleet of sixteen vessels 
totaling 136,554 deadweight tons.  The acquisition of the Italian vessels was followed 
in December 1941 by an agreement with Denmark to purchase four stranded 
refrigerated cargo ships.  These purchases were followed by the transf r of three 
former North German Lloyd vessels, four naval cargo vessels suitable for commercial 
use, and one coastal freighter from a private company.  In 1943, three French ships 
and an additional naval transport vessel were added to fleet.142  In total, the vessel 
acquisitions made by Argentina created a respectable fleet, but nearly all of the ships 
had to be engaged in trade with the United States.  The War Shipping Administration 
did not allocate any U.S. vessels to the Argentine trade, so Argentina depended 
heavily on its secondhand fleet.  As the war drew to a close, Argentina had to prepare 
for its postwar world trade.  Nearly all of the purchase agreements negotiatd with 
foreign countries for their vessels included a repurchase clause which could be 
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invoked after the cessation of hostilities.  At the end of the war, eleven ships were 
returned to their original owners.143 
 Once Argentina declared war on Germany in March 1945, the United States 
softened its stance against the country and began reevaluating Argentine postwar
trade policy and its requirements for ships.  Argentina began inquiring about both 
building and buying vessels from the United States immediately after the State 
Department acknowledged Argentina’s Allied status.  In May 1945, Italy notified 
Argentina of its intent to exercise its option to repurchase eight of the sixteen ships 
that it sold to Argentina in 1941.  The Argentine government in turn notified the 
Maritime Commission that it would like to obtain replacement vessels before 
releasing the eight to the Italians.  In addition, they stated their desire to build ten new 
vessels in U.S. yards.144 
 In 1945, the total number of vessels under Argentine flag was seventy-three, 
totaling 346,356 gross tons.  Of this number, twenty-six were tankers.  The Argentine 
State Shipping Line owned twenty-eight of these vessels.  Twenty-four were dry 
cargo ships and four were specialized refrigerated vessels.  Argentina’s plans for 
postwar trade included a strong, modern merchant marine, public and private, capable 
of carrying 50 percent of its export commerce.  The United States, Great Britain, 
Canada, and Sweden all expressed an interest in supplying new ships to Argentina.  
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The United States was also willing to supply surplus vessels under the terms of the 
Sales Act once passed into law.145  
 In 1946, Juan Peron came to power and his government continued to pursue 
strengthening the Argentine merchant marine.  As soon as the Sales Act permitted 
foreign sales, Argentina was allowed to purchase three Victory ships, followed by 
fifteen additional Victories, two Liberty ships, three T1 tankers, and two N3 coastal 
freighters.  In addition, contracts were signed with shipyards in the United States and 
Great Britain for new cargo vessels, and three ocean liners were ordered from Italy.146 
 In the midst of surplus vessel sales, the United States and Argentina were 
signatory to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance adopted on 
September 2, 1947.  The “Rio Treaty” as it came to be called, was a mutual assistance 
treaty that appeared to coincide with the newly unveiled Truman Doctrine and the 
U.S. policy of communist containment.  Some policy makers felt that the social, 
political and economic disparities present in South American countries made them 
susceptible to communist influence.147  The immediate postwar policy of conciliation 
with Argentina and its inclusion in the Rio Treaty were aimed at reducing that thre .  
 During the war years, the United States attempted to use its trade policies t  
influence the actions for the various military regimes in power in Argentina during 
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the Second World War.  In doing so, the State Department highlighted for Argentina 
its need for a stronger merchant marine.  When the United States decided on a more 
friendly posture toward Argentina, its government acted swiftly to procure surplu  
vessels which the Maritime Commission promptly delivered. 
 
Ships Without a State:  Norway, Sweden and Denmark 
 The merchant fleets of Norway, Sweden and Denmark were unique to the 
Allied war effort in that they operated independently during the war years.  Norway 
and Denmark were occupied by Nazi Germany early in the war, and Sweden assumed 
a historical position of neutrality.  The merchant vessels of these nations that were 
outside of their home waters when their countries were impacted by hostilities wer  
ultimately operated in support of the Allied war effort.  The British came to depend 
heavily on the vessels of Norway and Sweden from the very beginning of the war.  
Danish vessels made a contribution as well, but primarily from being seized in Allied 
ports and later being placed into wartime service under the flag of the country 
initiating the seizure. 
Norway 
 When Norway was invaded and occupied by the Germans in April 1940, the 
Norwegian royal family and many government officials fled the country and set up a 
government in exile in London.  From there the government directed its sizable 
merchant marine as part of the Allied war effort.  In 1939, Norway had the fourth 




thousand gross tons.148  When the war broke out, Norwegian shipping lines carried 
cargo for the British and joined in the trade blockage against Germany.  Fortunately, 
when the Germans moved against Norway, three-quarters of its vessels were outside 
home waters away from German control.  Norway derived most of its national 
income from shipping and commerce.  When the Royal Norwegian Government was 
established in London, it was able to function as a self-sustaining entity despite its 
state of exile.149 
 The business of shipping was directed by a government run management 
group, the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, known by its shortened from 
Nortraship.  Nortraship began its operation with 881 vessels over five hundred gross 
tons.  A majority were either chartered to the British or operated in support of Britain.  
The Minister of Shipping described the arrangement as state run shipping company 
that utilized private vessels, “for the duration of the war, the ships are sailing on 
behalf of the government.  The individual ship is being operated for a single purpose; 
namely to make it contribute to the war effort as efficiently as possible without any 
regard to the special interest of individual shipowners.”150  The Norwegian fleet was 
operated in this manner throughout the war. 
 There was a certain level of resentment on the part of some in the United 
States government that the Norwegians were operating as seagoing mercenaris, 
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engaged in the war for profit.151  This war not a fair characterization of the country in 
that Norway had always derived its income from shipping.  Because of its ships, 
Norway was able to support its government in London and its military wherever it 
was called to serve.152  During the war, Nortraship had total earnings of 2,345 million 
kroner or about 469 million dollars.  After expenses the Norwegian treasury netted
five hundred fifty million kroner or about one hundred ten million dollars.153 
 As previously mentioned, the early war years took a devastating toll on the 
merchant fleets of all Allied nations.  Norway suffered losses commensurate with the 
numbers of its vessels involved in the war effort.  By January 1943, Norway claimed 
to have lost 2.5 million tons of shipping, or 40 percent of the fleet that under their 
control.  Since this was its only source of income, Norwegian government was very 
aggressive during the war in seeking replacements for lost vessels and making 
restitution claims for damages to their ships.  The Norwegian Ambassador took his 
country’s case directly to President Roosevelt, asking him to authorize the sale 
American cargo vessels to the Royal Government.154  The president declined but the 
Norwegians received eight ships as part of its 1942 lend-lease agreement which were 
placed in operation under its own flag.  Great Britain was more obligated to the 
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Norwegians than the United States and it was able to sell them vessels under its 
established sales laws.155 
.   By the end of the war, the Norwegian fleet had been reduced by more than 
half of its original tonnage, and that included vessels sold to them by the British in the 
intervening years.  The special character of the Norwegian contribution to the Allied 
war effort was recognized in Article 7 of their Lend-Lease Agreement which the 
United States undertook to give consideration to reestablishing Norwegian shipping 
to its prewar levels.  The Maritime Commission acted to meet this consideration by 
approving the sale of eighty-five dry cargo ships and seventeen tankers totaling 
982,000 deadweight tons of shipping.156 
Sweden 
 Sweden entered the war with 484 vessels of all types with a cargo carrying 
capacity of approximately 2.6 million deadweight tons.  The nation maintained a 
policy of neutrality throughout the war, but made concessions to both sides in the 
conflict.  The concessions came mostly in the form of transportation.  Sweden 
allowed the Nazi Germany to utilize its rail system to transport soldiers and war 
material from Norway to Finland.  In addition, Swedish vessels inside the Baltic at 
the time that Norway was invaded remained in the Baltic and participated in wart me 
trade with Germany.  For the Allies, Sweden provided its oceangoing vessels outside
of the Baltic to the United Nations as chartered vessels. 
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 Sweden’s neutrality did not spare it from the level of losses incurred by the 
rest of the Allies.  Over the course of the war, it lost one hundred twenty vessels 
totaling 725,100 deadweight tons157  However Sweden was in a unique position in 
that its shipyards worked at full capacity during the war producing newer and larger 
merchant vessels.  The country continued to build ships even if they were not 
intended to be used and were placed in lay-up.  As a result, Sweden emerged from the 
war with a modern fleet of ships, its losses made up by the newly constructed vess ls.  
Since it had no need to build ships for its own use, Sweden actively sought and 
received orders from other countries to build new vessels.158  Norway was one of its 
first customers after the Germans surrendered.159  The Swedes ordered only six 
surplus vessels from the United States, two Liberties and four C1 cargo ships, all 
undoubtedly to be used in the Baltic trade.  In addition, two large Swedish ore carriers 
were under long-term charter to Bethlehem Steel Corp. transporting Chilean iron ore 
to Sparrows Point in Baltimore.  One of these vessels was lost in the war.  Bethlehem 
Steel built replacement vessels for the Swedish owners after the Allied victory.160 
 Since Sweden had new vessels, it promptly joined the postwar United 
Maritime Authority shipping pool and participated in relief operations in shipping 
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food to Greece.  At the same time, the State Department noted that Sweden was in a 
position to resume the trans-Pacific trade that it operated in prior to the war.  This 
route provided service from the United States to the Philippines, Asia, and Australia.  
Sweden was also well positioned with tankers, having thirty-five at the beginning of 
1946 that were expected to be long-term chartered to major oil companies.161  
 Sweden’s position of neutrality during World War II helped it to build up a 
modern merchant fleet that would contribute to the recovery of the postwar world.  
By participating in postwar relief shipments, and building new vessels for 
neighboring countries, Sweden was able to support the goals of the State Department 
because of its relative economic health.  In postwar terms, Sweden and its merchant 
marine were viewed by the United States as an asset to the world economy.162 
Denmark 
 Denmark fell to the Germans at the same time as Norway.  Most of 
Denmark’s merchant fleet was away from the Baltic when the Danes capitulated.  The 
Germans allowed the Danish monarchy to remain intact and the Royal Government 
remained in the country.  The Nazi occupation force did not permit the Danish 
merchant navy to continue operation.  As a result, vessels took refuge in foreign ports 
with no expectation of returning to sea. 
 Danish vessels in Allied ports were considered badly needed shipping 
resources that were going to waste.  As previously discussed, Argentina negotiated 
the purchase of four Danish refrigerator vessels that were idle in the River Platte that 
became part of its fledgling merchant marine in 1941.  These vessels became valuable 






to the Argentine government and the Allies because they were used to ship processed 
beef to Great Britain during the war.   
 Idle Danish vessels were a problem in the United States as well.  However th  
United States did not negotiate their purchase.  Denmark was one of the countries that 
had its vessels seized by the United States. Forty Danish ships were seized under the 
Espionage Act of 1917, since Denmark had been overrun by the Nazi’s.  The vessels 
that escaped the German occupation of Denmark were placed into Allied wartime 
service and many were lost.  The United States was bound by the law that permitted 
the seizure of the vessels to provide just compensation to their owners if the vessels 
were damaged or lost.  When the war was over, the United States engaged in 
contentious negotiations with Denmark over the just compensation for the use and 
loss of these vessels.  The vessel owners involved were ultimately satisfied with a 
cash settlement, and the United States provided five operators with a total of ninetee  
surplus ships under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946.163 
 
China Falls Short of its Ambitious Maritime Plans 
 In June1942, the United States entered into a lead-lease agreement with China 
that for all intents and purposes mirrored the one signed with the British at the start of 
the war in Europe.  Because of the difficulty of reaching China by ship without 
risking Japanese attack, lead-lease supplies were shipped into China by air.  It w s not 
until the United States had gained the upper hand in the Pacific that the postwar 
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development of Chinese shipping could be considered.  In March 1944, the State 
Department began investigating how to best assist the Chinese in their need for ships. 
 China’s maritime situation was a problem in three parts.  First, China had an 
extensive river system that necessitated the use of smaller shallow draught vessels 
suited primarily for inland use.  Second, China had a coastline of approximately nin  
thousand miles which required larger, more substantial vessels.  Finally, there was the 
need for ocean going vessels to conduct international trade.  Prior to the war, China’s 
trading needs were served by 1.5 million tons of shipping operated by the Chinese, 
Great Britain, the United States and Japan.  By 1944, China was making due with one 
hundred thousand tons of its own shipping confined to inland waters. 
 Two weeks before the Ship Sales Act was signed, Chinese President Chiang 
Kai-shek wrote directly to President Truman with a personal appeal to purchase 
Liberty ships.  Six Liberties were being assigned to service in Chinese waters under 
the operational control of the U.S. Army.  The general asked that China be allowed to 
purchase the vessels for cash so they could “use these ships in consonance with our 
projected economy program and for related purposes.”  Unfortunately, no one 
including the president had the legal authority to consummate such a sale, and 
Truman informed his Chinese counterpart that as soon as the ship sales bill became 
law, steps would be taken to arrange the sale.164 
 The sale of ships to China and all other matters relating to the Chinese 
government were being handled by General George C. Marshall.  The Chinese wer  
seeking to buy ten N3 coastal cargo ships from the Commission, and had already 
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purchased ten Laker-type float bottom freighters of 4,000 tons from Agwilines 
through a sale approved by the Commission.  In addition, the Chinese were being sold 
five old government-owned freighters as surplus.  In a State Department memo 
outlining the sales, the originator questioned how the U.S. government could sell 
these vessels to the Chinese while being restricted to the terms of the Sales Act for 
transactions with other countries.  The answer was found in the wording of the Act.  
The Sales Act only covered “war-built” vessels.  In this instance the vessels being 
sold were privately owned and built before the war.  Therefore, they could be sold to 
any approved party at the whim of the Commission. 165 
 The U.S. Army reassessed its requirements for ships to support the Chinese 
Army in Manchuria and the number was increased to ten vessels manned with 
Chinese crews.  Since the Sales Act stipulated a waiting period before foreign 
purchase could be made, no transfer of vessels to China could take place before July 
23, 1946.  However, the State Department wanted defacto transfer to take place as 
soon as possible by simply releasing the ships to Chinese control.  This could not be 
legally done so other measures had to be taken.  The Chinese Communists were 
making all vessels under U.S. control the focus of propaganda attacks against the 
Nationalist Chinese, claiming the evils of American influence.  The best that the 
United States was able to do was transfer the vessels to China under the terms of he 
Lead-Lease Act which would allow them to fly the Chinese flag.  This was 
accomplished by presidential order.  However, the retention of ownership still placed 
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the United States in a position of appearing to be offering direct support to the 
Nationalist Chinese in a rapidly developing civil conflict with the Chinese 
Communists.  As a precursor to the outright purchase of these vessels, the Chines  
government placed five and one half million dollars in escrow with the Maritime 
Commission. 
 In mid-1946, the Nationalist China made its ambitious plans apparent.  China 
made an application to the Maritime Commission to purchase 159 war-built vessels of 
the Liberty, Victory, C1, and N3 types in conjunction with an extension of seventy-
six million dollars in credit payable over the next twenty years.  Working through the 
National Advisory Council and the State Department, the scope of the Chinese plan 
was to restore its shipping capacity to prewar levels over the course of the ensuing 
two years.  As a precaution against unfavorable future political developments, 
General Marshall put forth the following proviso to be added to the conditions of the 
sale: 
 It is the desire of the United States Government that these commercial type 
 vessels be destined for a united and democratic China under a coalition 
 government.  It is therefore understood by the Chinese government that if it 
 appears to be in the best interest of the United States, this program for transfe 
 of these ships can be terminated unilaterally by the United States subject to 
 such financial adjustments as may be subsequently negotiated.166 
 
The Maritime Commission acted with no more urgency on China’s request for vessels 
that it had for any other foreign sales requests.  However, the civil strife in China was 
not helping to expedite approval of its large scale ship purchase plan.  China’s 
internal problems were creating economic instability which was contributing to its 
escalating civil strife.  The view from State Department personnel in Chia was that 
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the economic situation could be stabilized if the U.S. would take constructive and 
confident action.  In addition to issuing commodity credits and supporting internal 
projects, Washington was advised to act on the Chinese request for 159 vessels 
pending before the Maritime Commission.167 
 When the Commission did act, it was on the basis of what China had placed 
on deposit with the Commission.  The Maritime Commission’s bureaucratic delays in 
processing sales requests had allowed a large scale ship sales program to China to 
appear less appealing.  The Commission and the State Department acted in favor of 
selling China the vessels already in its possession, and went no further.  The U.S. 
Government utilized its escape clause to back away from any long term agreement 
with China, and moved toward settling its lend-lease accounts with the Chinese on the 
ships that they retained.168  In the end, the Republic of China purchased a total of 
thirty-three general cargo vessels, thirteen of which were the larger Liberty and 
Victory type.169 
  
Liberty Ships and the Soviets: An Unanticipated Gift 
 Liberty ships played one more small part in the Cold War struggle.  While the 
United States sold ships to European nations, it also engaged in protracted 
negotiations with the Soviet Union to settle claims regarding the lend-lease agre ment 
between the two nations.  Under the terms of the master lend-lease agreement, the 
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U.S.S.R. was required to return military and merchant vessels in their possessin, or 
be allowed to purchase eligible vessels under the terms of the Merchant Ship Sales 
Act of 1946.  When it became clear that the Soviet Union was not going to honor the 
terms of the lead-lease agreement, the United States began protracted negotiations to 
achieve a diplomatic solution to the situation.170   
 The Soviets sought to negotiate the purchase of each group of vessels 
separately while the United States insisted on an overall settlement.  It was not until 
1949 that the Soviets returned twenty-seven naval frigates and three ice breakers 
while continuing to string negotiation along with piecemeal settlement offers for the 
remaining ships.  During negotiations in December 1948, the U.S.S.R. offered $13 
million in cash for the thirty-six Liberty ships in its possession, an offer accepted by 
the United States contingent on an overall settlement.  By 1950, no further progress 
had been made, and relations between the two counties became increasingly straed.  
As a result, the Soviet Union enjoyed the use of thirty-six Liberty ships completely 
free of charge, compliments of the United States.  In some cases – most notablyT-2 
tankers -- these vessels were operated in direct competition with U.S. companies.171  
In that case, the Soviets used U.S.-owned vessels as bargaining chips for its own 
economic and strategic gain.  This dilemma was never resolved.  The Soviet Union 
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kept all the Liberty ships transferred to them under their lend-lease agreement, 
operating some into the 1970s.172 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 During World War II, the United States produced perhaps the most valuable 
commodity needed to win the war.  The commodity was oceangoing ships.  When the 
war broke out, Great Britain reminded the United States that for all intents and 
purposes, America was also and island nation.  The British came to the U.S. with a 
design for a homely ship asking only for a place to build sixty of them.  The United 
States obliged and adopted the Ocean class “ugly duckling,” transforming it into the 
Liberty Ship.  These humble ships formed the backbone of an emergency 
shipbuilding program that would ultimately produce 5,777 vessels of all different 
types.  This production miracle placed the United States in possession of 60 percent 
of the world’s merchant ship tonnage at the end of the war. 
 The United States Maritime Commission and the United States Department of 
State recognized the advantages and disadvantages of the precipitous build up early in 
the war.  In less than a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
Commission and the Department began working in cooperation to ensure that after 
the war the United States was not saddled with thousands of surplus ships, and that 
the world’s maritime nations would have sufficient tonnage to conduct international 
trade.  These goals were realized with passage of the Merchant Marine Sles Act of 
1946 which allowed the Maritime Commission to sell its surplus fleet.  The Act 
became law on March 8, 1946 and expired on February 28, 1948.  During this brief 
period, the Act helped accomplish two major U.S. objectives.  First, it facilitated he 
sale of approximately two thousand surplus merchant ships to domestic and foreign 




required vessels to conduct trade and generate income for their countries.  Restoring 
trade balances, providing a means of currency exchange, and establishing a system of 
multilateral trade, were all postwar goals of the U.S. State Department.  The various 
types of U.S. war-built ships suited those purposes and fulfilled many of the postwar 
shipping needs of the nations discussed, while those countries and others rebuilt, 
became revitalized, and invested in their own shipbuilding industries.  The following 
table summarizes sales of U.S. built vessels to the countries discussed and the effec  






Sold under the  
Act of 1946 
Sold under the  





 Freighters Deadweight Freighters Deadweight Freight rs Deadweight 
       
France 281 1,414.8 80 781.4 285 1,933.0 
       
Italy 395 2,340.8 103 833.5 249 2,007.0 
       
Greece 379 2,556.3 100 1041.9 193 1,704.0 
       
Argentina 10 54.8 19 208.9 65 560.0 
       
Norway 712 3,503.2 85 788.9 595 3,561.0 
       
Denmark 267 1,102.9 19 181.9 230 1,165.0 
       
Sweden 395 1,434.2 6 52.8 417 1,704.0 
       
China 83 242.7 33 254.8 138 665.0 
 
The table shows the numbers and cargo carrying capacity in thousands of tons for 
oceangoing freight ships over one thousand gross tons.  The comparison of the 1939 
and 1949 totals shows the dramatic war losses suffered nations engaged in the service 
of the Allied war effort.  It is abundantly clear that the vessels sold to these countries 
                                                
173 Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, Eigh y-First 
Congress, Second Session, Merchant Marine Study and Investigation (Washington, DC: 




under the terms of the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 restored their ability to 
conduct international trade to near their prewar capacity and thereby facilitated a 
more rapid economic recovery which in turn contributed to political stability.  An 
unanticipated consequence of the Act was its value as a tool in the postwar fight 
against communism. 
 As part of the U.S. aid packages offered to struggling nations after the war, 
surplus U.S. ships helped those nations to regain strength and project their 
sovereignty in ports throughout the world.  Through the sale of the notoriously “slow, 
uneconomical, and relatively poor” war-built vessels, the United States spurred both 
nationalist and capitalist sentiments by promoting free trade with relatively modern 
ships, purchased on easy terms.  In that way, countries could remove some of the 
stigma associated with a continuing stream of incoming U.S. aid by having ships 
flying their country’s flag carrying a significant portion of the fright.  In turn, the 
export cargo carried and the revenue earned by the vessels aided in the flow of much 
needed dollars to these countries which they used to pay back loans and improve their 
nation’s balance of payments.  By late 1949, France had nearly restored its prewar 
import-export levels and Italy had exceeded it prewar exports to the United Stas and 
developed a thriving trade with Russia and the Eastern Bloc.174  Greece remained 
enmeshed in civil war and heavily dependent on U.S. aid, but as previously discussed, 
Greek shipowners reaped the benefits of postwar trade.  As these countries resumed 
active trade with the West and experienced the effects of economic recovery, the 
policies of the political far left and national Communist parties became much less 
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powerful in the coalition governments of the period.  In South America, Argentina 
built up a respectable merchant fleet of dry cargo vessels and tankers and later 
passenger liners, establishing a presence on its country’s trade routes wher  none had 
previously existed. 
  In the early Cold War, the United States government utilized all the tools at its 
disposal to influence its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union and trying to contain 
the internal spread of national Communist parties.  A significant part of this effort 
was the sale of fleets of surplus U.S. merchant ships to free-world allies enabling 
countries such as France, Italy and Greece immediately engage in multilatera  trade as 
the world recovered from the World War.  The United States Maritime Commission 
and the U.S. Department of State worked cooperatively achieve this goal.  The “big 
stick” in the postwar period was the economic aid provided to European countries to 
speed recovery efforts.  The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan served this larger 
purpose, but indirect aid in the form of affordable surplus merchant vessels available 
because of the Ship Sales Act, served as means toward an end of gaining the hearts 
and minds of the thirty-four countries that purchased U.S. war-built ships.  The 
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 provided a tremendous opportunity for maritime 
nations to restore or increase their merchant ship tonnage economically, resume 
international commerce, and restore an element of national sovereignty.  At the same, 
the Act helped strengthen the position of the United States and it policies toward 







Ship Sales to Foreign Countries Under the  
Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946175 
 










      
Argentina Liberty 2 8/24/1946 4/8/1948 Cash 
[24] Victory 17   " 
 T1 Tanker 3   " 
 N3 Cargo 2   " 
      
Belgium Liberty 4 12/5/1946 5/6/1947 Cash 
[15] Victory 10   " 
 T2 Tanker 1   " 
      
Brazil C1 Cargo 12 3/7/1947 6/20/1947 Mortgage 
      
Canada T2 Tanker 8 11/15/1946 3/10/1948 Cash 
      
Chile C1 Cargo 2 9/5/1946 5/25/1948 Cash 
[6] C2 Cargo 4   " 
      
China Liberty 10 6/21/1947 8/5/1948 Mortgage 
[33] Victory 3   " 
 C1 Cargo 12   " 
 N3 Cargo 8   " 
      
Columbia C1 Cargo 8 2/21/1947 4/28/1947 Cash 
      
Cuba C1 Cargo 4 1/13/1948 2/16/1948 Cash 
      
Denmark Liberty 9 11/22/1946 3/14/1947 Cash 
[19] Victory 3   " 
 C1 Cargo 7   " 
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Egypt C1 Cargo 2 11/24/1946 11/24/1946 Cash 
      
Finland Liberty 2 7/11/1947 5/4/1948 Mortgage 
[3] N3 Cargo 1    
      
France Liberty 76 11/26/1946 5/11/1948 Mortgage 
[98] C1 Cargo 4   " 
 T2 Tanker 18   " 
      
Greece Liberty 98 12/18/1946 2/27/1948 Mortgage 
[107] C1 Cargo 2   " 
 T2 Tanker 7   Cash 
      
Honduras Liberty 20 11/8/1946 4/5/1948 Cash 
[23] C1 Cargo 3   " 
      
Iceland C1 Cargo 1 2/2/1948 2/2/1948 Cash 
      
India Liberty 8 1/20/1947 5/3/1948 Cash 
[14] Victory 6   " 
      
Iran Liberty 1 5/17/1948 5/17/1948 Cash 
      
Italy Liberty 95 12/20/1946 5/28/1948 Mortgage 
[123] T2 Tanker 20   " 
 N3 Cargo 8   " 
      
Netherlands Liberty 28 10/31/1946 5/19/1948 Cash (73) 
[84] Victory 32   
Mortgage 
(11) 
 C1 Cargo 8    
 C2 Cargo 1    
 T1 Tanker 7    
 T2 Tanker 5    
 N3 Cargo 3    
      
New Zealand C1 Cargo 2 2/26/1947 3/30/1948 Cash 
      
Nicaragua N3 Cargo 2 3/8/1948 4/8/1948 Cash 
      




[102] C1 Cargo 40   
Mortgage 
(39) 
 T2 Tanker 17    
      
Pakistan Liberty 1 5/17/1948 5/17/1948 Cash 
      
Panama Liberty 63 11/6/1946 5/8/1948 Cash 
[152] Victory 7   " 
 C1 Cargo 7   " 
 C2 Cargo 3   " 
 T1 Tanker 1   " 
 T2 Tanker 71   " 
      
Peru Victory 2 2/20/1947 4/17/1947 Mortgage 
[8] C1 Cargo 4   " 
 N3 Cargo 2   " 
      
Philippines C1 Cargo 6 4/23/1947 3/28/1948 Cash (2) 
     
Mortgage 
(4) 
      
Poland Victory 1 7/18/1947 7/18/1947 Cash 
      
Portugal N3 Cargo 3 12/4/1947 12/31/1947 Cash 
      
South Africa Liberty 4 3/11/1947 5/21/1948 Cash 
[9] Victory 3   " 
 T2 Tanker 2   " 
      
Sweden Liberty 2 11/18/1946 4/12/1948 Cash 
[6] C1 Cargo 4   " 
      
Turkey Victory 2 2/14/1947 12/9/1947 Mortgage 
[10] C1 Cargo 4   " 
 T1 Tanker 1   " 
 T2 Tanker 1   " 
 N3 Cargo 2   " 
      
United 
Kingdom Liberty 118 10/11/1946 12/17/1947 Cash 




 C1 Cargo 5   " 
 T2 Tanker 51   " 
 N3 Cargo 30   " 
      
Uruguay Liberty 2 2/6/1947 5/3/1948 Cash (2) 
[6] C1 Cargo 2   
Mortgage 
(4) 
 T2 Tanker 2    
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